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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to review the agricultural trade and domestic policies of the Philippines and 
to provide an assessment of the types and levels of domestic support relative to the rules of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Changes in trade protection and support in the Philippines, including tariff 
structure, quantitative restrictions, and domestic support, are discussed and analyzed. The paper also 
discusses the pattern of public expenditure on agriculture in the Philippines, including  major agricultural 
productivity-enhancing programs. 
The present structure of protection and support favors the agricultural sector. Trade protection is 
higher in agriculture relative to manufacturing. There is a quantitative restriction on rice imports and a 
tariff rate quota in several agricultural commodities. The green box payments and the special and 
differential treatment constitute the major domestic support for agriculture. These support payments are 
relatively substantial and will continue to be sizable in the future to support the government’s food 
sufficiency policy. However, the trade-distorting market price support for rice and corn is significantly 
below the de minimis limit that applies to the Philippines under the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
Keywords: Philippine agriculture; agricultural support; WTO Doha Round; notification of 
domestic support; WTO compliance 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Philippine agricultural sector employs 36 percent of the labor force and accounts for roughly 14 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). When the agriculture-based food-processing sector is included, 
the whole of agriculture contributes 26 percent to GDP. From the 1950s to the 1970s, government 
policies were biased against agriculture (David 2003; Intal and Power 1990). During this period, the 
government implemented the following policies: (a) an import substitution policy until the 1980s, 
creating a bias in favor of manufacturing and against agriculture and exports, which effectively penalized 
the returns to agricultural investments; (b) export taxes and an exchange rate overvaluation, which greatly 
reduced earnings from agriculture; and (c) an intervention through the creation of government 
corporations, which, based on a number of studies, siphoned off the gains from trade (Intal and Power 
1990). However, starting in the early 1980s, policy shifted toward protecting agriculture. The system of 
protection included higher tariffs and a nominal protection rate, as compared with the manufacturing 
sector, as well as high domestic support (Aldaba 2005; David 2003).  
The objective of this paper is to analyze trade policies and public domestic support of agriculture 
in the Philippines and to assess the types and levels of domestic support relative to rules of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). One of the government’s key goals in agriculture is a stable supply of food at 
affordable prices, pursued through trade protection and domestic support to agriculture. The domestic 
support comes in various forms. Some supports, such as roads, market infrastructure, irrigation, and 
postharvest facilities, are of a public good in nature. Other supports include product-specific interventions 
that affect markets and behavior of producers. In the context of the WTO, there are limits to the extent of 
these supports. This paper analyzes the support to agriculture in the case of the Philippines relative to the 
limits set by the WTO.  
The paper is organized as follows. Following introduction in the first section, section 2 gives an 
overview of changes in the Philippine economic structure, particularly in agriculture. This section also 
includes a discussion of trade policies, public expenditure patterns in agriculture, and government 
program on rice productivity. Section 3 analyzes public domestic support in agriculture. As a member of 
the WTO, the Philippines has committed to submitting regular official notifications to the WTO on 
domestic support, market access, and export subsidies. However, it has not been current in its submission, 
with the latest notification covering the year 2001. To make the analysis current, this section estimates 
domestic support from 2002 to 2006 and provides projections up to 2013. Section 4 presents a brief 
summary and conclusion. Lastly, there are two appendices at the end of the paper: appendix A describes 
the method used in replicating the domestic support level for 2001, in estimating from 2002 to 2008, and 
in projecting from 2009 to 2013; and appendix B evaluates the market price support for rice and corn 
from 1995 to 2001, provides estimates from 2002 to 2008, and projects from 2009 to 2013.      
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2.  PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND POLICIES 
To put the discussion in perspective, this section briefly describes the structure of the Philippine economy, 
with particular focus on agriculture. It highlights major shifts in policies in trade and agriculture, as well as 
patterns of the nominal protection rate and public expenditure in agriculture. This section also discusses the 
government’s rice productivity program, including the program design, cost, and performance. 
Structure of the Philippine Economy 
Over the past two decades, there have been significant changes in the structure of the Philippine economy. 
The share of agriculture declined from 22 percent in 1991–94 to 14 percent in 2005–07 (Table 1). Over 
the same period, the shares of industry and manufacturing remained relatively stable at about 30 percent 
and 20 percent, respectively, while the share of the services increased from 45 percent to 54 percent. 
Palay (rice paddy) is the dominant crop in agriculture. In the last 15 years, there has been an 
increase in agricultural land devoted to palay production. Of the available agricultural land, 26 percent 
was planted with palay in 1993 (Table 2). The share increased to 34 percent in 2005. The share of palay in 
the value of agricultural output has increased from 29 percent in 1993 to 36 percent in 2007. 
Table 1. Production structure of the Philippine economy (% share) 
Sectors 1991-94 1995-99 2000-04  2005-07
Agriculture, fishery and forestry                 21.6                 19.0                 15.1                   14.2 
Agriculture and fishery                   21.2                   18.9                   15.1                    14.1 
Forestry                     0.4                     0.2                     0.1                      0.1 
Industry                  33.0                  31.7                  31.9                   31.6 
Mining and quarrying                     1.2                     0.7                     0.8                      1.3 
Manufacturing                   24.1                   22.3                   22.9                    22.7 
Construction                     5.3                     5.9                     5.0                      4.0 
Electricity, gas and  water                     2.5                     2.7                     3.1                      3.6 
Services                  45.4                  49.3                  53.0                   54.2 
Total                100.0                100.0                100.0                 100.0 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, National Income Accounts, various issues. 
Table 2. Production structure of Philippine agriculture (% share) 







A. Cereals  51.4 40.9  54.1  48.6 
   Palay 
/2/  26.3 28.6  33.8  35.7 
   Corn  25.2 12.3  20.3  12.9 
B. Major crops  33.0 34.4  36.6  35.6 
   Coconut  24.6 13.2  27.0  11.7 
   Sugarcane  3.1 5.5  3.1  5.7 
   Banana  2.6 6.0  3.5  11.4 
   Pineapple  0.3 3.1  0.4  1.9 
   Coffee  1.2 1.6  1.1  1.1 
   Mango  0.5 3.6  1.4  3.4 
   Tobacco  0.7 1.4  0.2  0.4 
C. Other crops  15.6 24.8  9.3  15.8 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source : Department of Agriculture. Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: /1/ Data for 2005 
/2/ Rice paddy 3 
 
Corn and coconut are also major agricultural crops in the Philippines. The share of agricultural 
land devoted to corn production has declined from 25 percent in 1993 to 20 percent in 2005, while the 
share of agriculture land planted with coconut has increased from 25 percent to 27 percent. The share of 
corn in the value of agricultural output has improved slightly from 12 percent in 1993 to 13 percent in 
2007, while the share of coconut has declined from 13 percent to 12 percent.   
There have also been significant shifts in the structure of demand—most notably in foreign trade, 
which has evolved as a dominant sector in the Philippine economy. The share of exports of goods and 
services has improved from 30 percent in 1990–94 to 46 percent in 2005–07 (Table 3). Likewise, the 
share of imports of goods and services has increased from 36 percent in 1990–94 to 47 percent in 2005–
07. 
Table 3. Expenditure structure of the Philippine economy, (% share) 
Expenditure  items  1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Private  consumption  74.1 73.4 69.5 69.7 
Government  consumption  10.1 12.6 11.6  9.7 
Gross capital formation  22.8  22.1  18.3  14.8 
Exports of goods and services  30.3  45.9  51.1  45.8 
Less: Imports of goods and services  (36.0)  (52.6)  (53.3)  (47.4) 
Statistical discrepancy  (1.3)  (1.4)  2.9  7.4 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, National Accounts of the Philippines, various issues  
Within merchandise exports, the share of agricultural exports has dropped from 40 percent in 
1980–84 to 7 percent in 2005–06 (Table 4), while the share of manufactured exports surged from 44 
percent to 88 percent in those same years. Within manufactured exports, there have been significant shifts 
as well. Exports of clothing and garments at first saw strong growth, though this was later surpassed by 
the growth in exports of electronic products. At present, 60 percent of the US$47 billion merchandise 
exports from the Philippines comprise office and telecom equipment, of which semiconductor is a major 
sub-sector. The declining share of garment exports from the Philippines is partly due to the entry of 
exports of clothing from China. More significant is the absence of a competitive and efficient local textile 
industry that supports the garments sector, as fabrics used in garments are mostly imported. 
Table 4. Foreign trade structure of the Philippine economy 
Commodities  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-06 
Structure of exports (average % share)        
Agricultural  products  40.3  28.3  18.5 9.5 6.0 6.6 
Food  34.5  23.9  17.0 8.6 5.5 6.1 
Fuels and mining products  15.4  11.1  8.2  3.9  3.1  5.4 
Fuels  1.0  na 2.3 1.2 1.2 2.0 
Manufactures  44.3 60.6 73.3 86.6 90.9 88.0 
Iron  and  steel  1.0  na 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 
Chemicals  1.8  na 2.8 1.5 1.1 1.5 
Pharmaceuticals  0.1  na 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Machinery  and  transport  equipment  19.6 25.7 36.0 65.1 75.7 72.3 
Office  and  telecom  equipment  17.7 21.6 30.0 56.7 64.8 56.8 
Electronic data processing and office equipment  0.0  na  2.2  15.8  20.1  18.2 
Telecommunications  equipment  0.4  na 7.4 4.4 3.1 2.2 
Integrated circuits and electronic components  0.9  na  13.0  39.7  41.6  36.4 
Automotive  products  0.7  na 0.7 1.4 2.5 3.5 
Textiles  1.1 1.0 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.6 
Clothing  9.8  16.4  19.7 9.9 6.5 5.6 4 
 
Table 4. Continued 
Commodities  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-06 
Structure of imports (average % share)        
Agricultural  products  11.2 12.8 11.0 10.0  8.7  7.5 
Food  9.0  10.1 8.7 8.3 7.5 6.7 
Fuels  and  mining  products  30.5 20.9 16.5 11.2 13.2 16.9 
Fuels  32.0  na 13.0  8.4 10.7 14.5 
Manufactures  58.4 66.3 72.5 78.7 78.1 75.6 
Iron  and  steel  5.8  na 4.8 3.9 2.9 2.6 
Chemicals  11.0  na  10.6 8.6 8.2 7.3 
Pharmaceuticals  1.0  na 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Machinery  and  transport  equipment  32.0 33.3 42.1 54.3 56.7 57.6 
Office  and  telecom  equipment  10.6 15.5 17.6 32.1 41.9 44.5 
Electronic data processing and office equipment  0.7  na  2.6  7.3  9.6  7.6 
Telecommunications  equipment  1.6  na 5.3 4.9 4.5 2.6 
Integrated circuits and electronic components  0.4  na  7.8  21.9  27.8  34.3 
Automotive  products  3.7  na 4.3 3.8 2.7 2.1 
Textiles  3.9 7.5 6.4 3.8 3.1 2.2 
Clothing  0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
Commodities    1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-06 
Export less Imports (million US$)        
Agricultural  products  1,201  681  57  -1,086 -994 -807 
Food  1,076  636  291 -719 -765 -638 
Fuels  and  mining  products  -1,562  -834 -1,826 -2,801 -3,766 -5,942 
Fuels  -462  na -1,846 -2,502 -3,510 -6,292 
Manufactures  -2,206 -1,383 -4,561 -3,817  3,798  1,404 
Iron  and  steel  -76  na  -730 -1,232 -1,048 -1,122 
Chemicals  -144  na -1,441 -2,463 -2,633 -2,945 
Pharmaceuticals -13  na -179 -316 -361 -467 
Machinery and transport equipment  -1,454  -1,009  -3,352  -874  6,196  3,371 
Office and telecom equipment  106  133  188  4,272  7,641  2,988 
            Electronic data processing and office equipment  -10  na  -32  1,506  3,653  4,227 
Telecommunications  equipment  -20  na  -17 -440 -491 -308 
Integrated circuits and electronic components  3  na  6  3,051  4,479  -932 
Automotive  products  -281 -265 -650 -919  -95  496 
Textiles -239  -504  -863 -956 -852 -840 
Clothing  503  997 1,947 2,262 2,265 2,351 
Source: World Trade Organization Time Series on Merchandise and Commercial Services Trade 
Note: na-not available 
In contrast, the structure of imports indicates a relatively stable share of agricultural imports—
about 10 percent, which are mainly food items. At present, of the US$50 billion merchandise imports of 
the Philippines, almost 60 percent comprise office and telecom equipment. This is primarily for the 
semiconductor sector, which is generally an assembly-type operation in which the main value addition is 
labor. Raw materials are imported from foreign companies operating in the Philippines. Thus, despite the 
surge in manufactured exports (Table 4), the share of manufacturing in the overall GDP (Table1) has not 
improved through the years. 
Another notable trend in Table 4 is the deterioration in agriculture net trade, particularly in food 
net trade. From a net exporter in agricultural and food of more than US$1 billion per year in the first half 5 
 
of the 1980s, the Philippines has experienced a continuous decline in its net trade position in these 
commodities. In 2005-06, the annual average agriculture trade deficit was US$800 million, of which the 
bulk was food imports. This is despite government’s effort to implement food self-sufficiency policies 
and programs.  
The literature attributes the growing trade deficit in agriculture and food to higher growth in 
domestic demand relative to domestic production. The growth in domestic production lags behind 
demand because of declining agricultural productivity and comparative advantage. David (2003) has 
shown decreasing trend in revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in agriculture and agricultural exports 
in Table 5, which indicates declining Philippine competitiveness in the international market. As a result, 
its agricultural export share in the world market has declined sharply. Furthermore, Coxhead and 
Jayasuriya (2003) have shown declining lowland and upland productivity in the Philippines. Also, Habito 
and Briones (2005) have indicated that while the Philippines is at par with other countries in land 
productivity, the overall productivity in the crop subsector has stagnated. Moreover, while David (2003) 
has noted an improvement in productivity in poultry and livestock, on the whole Mundlak, et al. (2004) 
have indicated that the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) in agricultural output growth fell 
sharply from 36 percent in 1961-80 to 9 percent in 1980-98. This trend is in sharp contrast to the 
experience of Thailand and Indonesia where substantial TFP improvements occurred over the same 
period. 
Table 5. Trend in revealed comparative advantage in agriculture 
               Pineapple 
Year Agriculture  Coconut  Sugar  Banana  Canned  Fresh 
1960 3.0  na  na na  na na 
1965 2.7  131.8 15.3 na  na na 
1970 2.6  145.0 21.4 na  na na 
1975 3.8  211.2 22.0  29.3  na na 
1980 2.9  224.1 12.1  30.4 82.2  48.9 
1985 2.4  212.3  7.6  31.2 91.6  59.7 
1990 1.6  212.4  3.8  23.4 70.2  54.6 
1995 1.1  153.5  2.0  14.1 41.5  23.6 
1998 0.8  105.3  1.4  8.8 33.2  11.5 
Source: David (2003) 
Note: na-not available 
On the other hand, higher demand is a result of increased demand for items with higher income 
elasticities such as wheat, milk and dairy products, beef, etc., in which the Philippines does not have 
comparative advantage (David, Intal and Baliscan, 2007). In the case of rice, there has been a build up the 
level of rice stocks. Also, there is higher demand because of high growth in population (Dawe, Moya, and 
Casiwan, 2006). The average annual population growth rate in the Philippines is about 2.3 percent, which 
is high compared to the dynamic economies in the region. 
Trade Policies 
In 1949, the Philippines embarked on a development strategy of industrial import substitution with lesser 
emphasis on agriculture and exports. The strategy provided protection to domestic producers of final 
goods through high tariffs on competing imports and low tariffs on essential producer inputs. The policy 
did not accomplish much because the growth of manufacturing value added and industrial employment 
increased only minimally. In 1970, the government shifted toward export promotion by extending tax 
exemptions and fiscal incentives to capital-intensive firms located in export processing zones. However, 
the strategy achieved very little as well because of the continued presence of a highly skewed intersectoral 6 
 
tariff protection in favor of import-substituting manufactured goods. In addition, the imposition of export 
taxes, the policy of keeping an overvalued exchange rate, and the presence of government corporations, 
which not only regulated domestic prices but also siphoned off the gains from domestic and international 
trade, created a strong bias against agriculture and exports. 
The restrictive trade policies adopted between the 1950s and the late 1970s created serious market 
distortions (Austria and Medalla, 1996). They penalized the domestic economy in three respects: (a) 
import controls resulted in an overvalued exchange rate that favored import-substituting firms; (b) 
continued protection increased domestic output prices, which became an impediment to forward linkages; 
and (c) tariff escalations and import controls weakened backward linkages, as tariffs on capital and 
intermediate goods were kept low relative to finished products. 
The policy structure during this period promoted rent-seeking activities and distorted economic 
incentives against investments in agriculture. The agricultural sector, which served as the country’s 
backbone, providing the necessary foreign exchange needed by the import-dependent manufacturing 
sector, stagnated, and its comparative advantage eroded. This prolonged system of protection resulted in 
the industrial sector venturing on import-dependent, assembly-type operations with minimal value-added 
content. Realizing the pitfalls of the import-substitution policy followed by an unsuccessful export-
promotion strategy, the government started implementing a series of trade reform programs (TRPs) in 
1981.
1 
The first phase of the tariff reform program (TRP 1) started in the early 1980s with three major 
components: tariff reductions, an import-liberalization program, and realignment of indirect taxes. The 
maximum tariff rates were reduced from 100 to 50 percent. Between 1983 and 1985, sales taxes on 
imports and locally produced goods were equalized. The markup applied to the value of imports (for sales 
tax valuation) was also reduced and eventually eliminated. The implementation of TRP 1 was suspended 
in the mid-1980s because of a balance of payments crisis; it was resumed in 1986. 
In 1991, the government launched TRP 2 to realign tariff rates over a five-year period. The 
realignment involved narrowing tariff rates through a series of reductions in the number of commodity 
lines with high tariffs and an increase in the number of commodity lines with low tariffs. The program 
was aimed at clustering tariff rates within the 10 to 30 percent range by 1995. In 1992, a program to 
convert quantitative restrictions (QRs) into tariff equivalents was initiated. In 1995, the Philippines, under 
the WTO, committed to gradually removing QRs from sensitive agricultural product imports (products 
identified by the government as being politically sensitive in nature), with the exception of rice, by 
switching toward tariff measures. 
In 1995, the government implemented TRP 3 which established a four-tier tariff schedule: 3 
percent for raw materials and capital equipment not available locally, 10 percent for raw materials and 
capital equipment available from local sources, 20 percent for intermediate goods, and 30 percent for 
finished goods. However, the overriding goal of TRP 3 was to implement a uniform tariff rate of 5 
percent by 2005.  
Furthermore, in 1996 under TRP 3, the government implemented a tariff quota system for 
sensitive agricultural products. According to the minimum access volume (MAV) provision, a relatively 
low tariff rate was imposed on imported sensitive agricultural products up to a minimum import level (in-
quota tariff rate), while a higher tariff rate was levied beyond the minimum import level (out-quota tariff 
rate). Table 6 lists products with the MAV provision, including the in-quota and out-quota tariff rates. 
One can observe that whereas there has been reduction in the out-quota tariff rates across commodities, 
the in-quote rates have remained generally unchanged since 1996. By 2005, the in-quota and out-quota 
tariffs for several products were equalized, though still at relatively high levels.  
                                                 
1 The TRPs were major components of the structural programs funded by loans from the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in the 1980s. 7 
 
Table 6. In-quota and out-quota tariff rates of selected commodities (%) 
Commodities/tariff rates  1996 2000 2005 
Live pork (swine)       
Less than 50 kgs       
In-quota 30  30  30 
Out-quota 60  45  35 
50 kgs or more       
In-quota 30  30  30 
Out-quota 40  35  35 
Live sheep and goat       
In-quota 30  30  30 
Out-quota 60  45  40 
Live poultry (2000 grams or more)       
In-quota 40  40  35 
Out-quota 80  50  40 
Pork meat (swine)       
In-quota 30  30  30 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Meat of sheep, goats (fresh or chilled)       
In-quota 30  30  30 
Out-quota 60  40  35 
Chicken meat       
In-quota 50  45  40 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Duck meat       
In-quota 50  45  30 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Potato (fresh or chilled)       
In-quota 50  45  40 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Onions      
In-quota 30  30  40 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Garlic      
In-quota 30  30  40 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Coffee      
In-quota 50  45  30 
Out-quota 100  60  40 
Sugar Cane       
In-quota 50  50  50 
Out-quota 100  65  65 
Corn      
In-quota  35 35 35 
Out-quota  100 65  50 
Rice (milled or wholly milled)  50  50  50 
Source: Tariff Commission 
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In 1998, TRP 4 was undertaken to recalibrate the tariff rate schedules implemented under the 
previous TRPs. The decision to recalibrate resulted from a tariff review process that evaluated the pace of 
tariff reduction in line with the competitiveness of the local industry and to raise additional government 
revenues. The planned uniform tariff rate in TRP 3 was suspended under the TRP 4.  
Table 7 shows the effects of the series of TRPs on nominal tariff rates. The overall average tariff 
rate declined from 28.8 percent in 1990–94 to 10.8 percent in 2004, though it increased to 14.8 percent in 
2005. Although all tariff rates across commodities decreased, there are differences in the rates of decline. 
The average tariff rate on agriculture in 1990–94 was 23.6 percent, which was lower than the average 
tariff rate on manufacturing (32.3 percent) and on food processing (46.2 percent). In 2004, the average 
tariff rate on agriculture was 20.l percent, whereas in manufacturing, it was 9.9 percent. The ratio of the 
average tariff on agriculture to the average tariff on manufacturing increased from 0.8 in 1990 to 1.5 in 
2004. However, in 2005, an increase in the average tariff rate on manufacturing (to 15.2 percent) was 
largely due to the increase in the tariff rate on food processing (to 31.6 percent). Aldaba (2005) attributed 
the increase in tariffs on manufactured commodities in 2005 as policy reversal in trade which tends to 
undermine the gains from the series of tariff reform program implemented. This policy reversal in trade is 
the outcome of political pressures from various interest groups. 
Table 7. Most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates in the Philippines 
Sectors  1990-94 1995-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sectoral  weighted  average  28.8  21.3 17.4 14.1 12.6 11.8 10.8 14.4 
Agriculture,  fishery  and  forestry  23.6  19.5 16.6 15.7 15.1 14.9 14.5 14.4 
Mining  1.4  0.7  -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Manufacturing  32.3  23.2 18.7 14.3 12.4 11.3  9.9 15.2 
Food  processing  46.2  40.4 35.1 27.0 24.6 23.1 21.5 31.6 
Ratio (%): agriculture tariff ÷ manufacturing 
tariff  0.7  0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 0.9 
Source: Tariff Commission 
Estimates of the Nominal Protection Rate of Major Crops 
David, Intal, and Balisacan (2007) provided estimates of nominal protection rate (NPR) of major 
agricultural commodities. Table 8 presents the historical NPRs of 8 key agricultural commodities.
2    
In the second half of 1970s and the first half of 1980s the NPR of rice was negative. The negative 
NPR however had little effects on the producers because of high world commodity prices together with 
the implementation of the Green Revolution and the land reform programs. During the Green Revolution 
there was an expansion of irrigation and introduction of new seeds and fertilizer which increased rice 
productivity. The government also increased credit facilities to rice farmers. Under the land reform 
program tenant rice farmers became owner-operators. 
                                                 
2 The estimates of NPRs of David, Intal and Baliscan (2007) ended in 2004. We extended the series to 2007 using available 
data from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippine Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. Furthermore, in 
the original estimates of David, Intal and Baliscan (2007), the NPRs for chicken, pork and beef were derived using Singapore 
import unit value. To be consistent with the NPRs of the other commodities, the NPRs presented in Table 8 for chicken, pork and 
beef were derived using the world price of these items as reported in the World Bank database. Similar to David, Intal and 
Baliscan (2007), to convert world prices to border prices we factored in additional 15 percent to the world prices to account for 
cost, insurance and freight (CIF). 9 
 
Table 8. Nominal protection rate (%) 
            Coconut          
Year Rice  Corn  Sugar  Oil  Copra  Beef  Chicken  Pork 
1960-64 20  53  9  -16  -24  30 115  -13 
1965-69 12  44  86  -29  -31  -32 163  -24 
1970-74 4 19 -37  -31  -35 -53 84  -38 
1975-79 -13  30  -26  -20  -28  -25  91  -39 
1980-84 -13  25  19  -28  -37  15  100  -28 
1985-89 16  67  122  -16  -31  6  56  2 
1990-94 26  70  51  -7  -26  31  69  43 
1995-99 67  86  107  -12  -20  103  43  88 
2000 87 104  82  -17  -33  73  23  53 
2001 83  79  73  -21  -33  26  8  37 
2002 63  51  111  -13  -18  18  5  76 
2003 49  30  86  21  -20  28  -2  49 
2004 21  41  47  -10  -30  -1  -5  32 
2005 15  53  15  -16  -34  5  0  47 
2006 19  51  2  -11  -32  16  22  80 
2007 27  32  80  -10  -28  26  27  94 
Source: David, Intal and Balisacan (2007) for 1960 to 2005, International Monetary Fund Commodity Prices (2008) and Bureau 
of Agricultural Statistics (2008) for 2006 and 2007. 
However, the sharp fall in irrigation investments and the stagnation of the yield potential of newer 
modern varieties in the 1980s slowed down domestic production of rice. The drop in the world price of 
rice increased the NPR of rice from the average 16 percent in 1985-89 to 67 percent in 1995-99. It 
reached a peak of 87 percent in 2000. However, there has been a general decline in the NPR of rice after 
reaching a peak of 87 percent in 2000. In 2005, the NPR of rice dropped to its lowest level of 15 percent. 
There are two reasons behind the declining NPR: the increase in the world price of rice and the 
depreciation of the Philippine currency. Table 9 shows that the world price of rice increased from US$192 
per metric ton in 2001 to US$301 per metric ton in 2005 while the exchange rate depreciated from 
PhP44/US$1 to PhP55/US$1. In contrast, the wholesale price of rice increased only from PhP15.9 
thousand in 2000 to PhP19.1 thousand per metric in 2005.  
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Table 9. Exchange rate, world prices, and domestic wholesale prices 
      World price, CIF, US$/metric ton 
/a/  Wholesale price, PhP 000/metric ton 
        Coconut           Coconut      
Year  PHP/US$  Rice Corn Sugar  Oil Copra  Beef Chicken  Pork Rice Corn Sugar  Oil Copra  Beef Chicken Pork 
1960-64               4      109        58      119        322      209        837         502        885   0.5  0.3  0.3  0.9  0.5  3.8  3.6  2.5 
1965-69               4      145        61        58        405      241     1,210         431        993   0.6  0.3  0.4  1.1  0.7  3.2  4.4  3.0 
1970-74               7      222        93      280        578      361     1,776         535     1,317   1.1  0.7  0.7  2.8  1.6  5.4  6.4  5.2 
1975-79               7      304      125      292        703      478     2,170         796     2,184   1.9  1.2  1.4  4.1  2.6  11.2  11.2  9.9 
1980-84             17      346      147      343        826      541     2,838         907      2,950   2.9  1.9  2.9  6.7  3.9  33.5  18.1  21.4 
1985-89             22      263      114      202        554      377     2,695      1,096     2,509   6.1  3.8  8.1  9.6  5.4  59.0  34.8  47.4 
1990-94             26      293      122      267        553      370     2,905      1,290     1,857   9.4  5.4  10.4  13.5  7.2  99.5  56.8  65.2 
1995-99             39      293      138      263        799      514     2,097      1,528     1,610   15.3  7.9  16.5  22.7  13.4  134.6  68.7 90.9 
2000             44      192      102      207        518      350     2,222      1,504     1,500   15.9  9.2  16.7  19.1  10.4  169.6  81.6  101.5 
2001             51      171      103      219        366      232     2,449      1,610     1,554   16.0  9.4  19.3  14.7  7.9  157.5  88.7  108.4 
2002             52      196      114      175        484      306     2,421      1,596     1,196   16.5  8.9  19.0  21.7  13.0  146.9  86.2  108.8 
2003             54      205      121      180        537      345     2,277      1,675     1,351   16.5  8.6  18.1  35.3  14.9  157.5  88.5  109.0 
2004             56      256      129      182        760      518     2,889      1,916     1,797   17.3  10.1  14.9  38.4  20.3  160.4  101.9  132.4 
2005             55      301      113      256        710      476     3,017      1,876     1,724   19.1  9.5  16.2  33.0  17.4  174.8  103.8  139.3 
2006             51      319      140      375        698      463     2,941      1,749     1,623   19.5  10.9  19.6  31.8  16.2  175.8  109.9  149.7 
2007             46      352      187      254     1,057      698     2,992      1,978     1,623   20.7  11.4  21.1  44.1  23.1  173.6  116.2  145.2 
Source: David, Intal and Balisacan (2007) for 1960 to 2004, International Monetary Fund Commodity Prices (2008) and Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (2008) for 2006 and 2007 
/a/ CIF means cost, insurance and freight. 
 11 
 
The NPR of corn has always been positive and increasing years prior to 2000. The NPR of corn 
reached a peak of 104 percent in 2000. However, unlike rice which is staple food of Filipinos, there is not 
much political pressure on corn.  The high domestic corn prices are major concerns only for livestock 
growers because corn is a major animal feed ingredient.  
Similar to rice, there has been a declining trend in the NPR of corn after the peak in 2000. The 
NPR dropped to its lowest value of about 30 percent in 2003 and 2007. This trend is due to higher world 
prices of corn and to the depreciation of the Philippine currency. The world price of corn increased from 
US$102 per metric ton in 2000 to US$187 in 2007. The domestic wholesale price of corn increased only 
from PhP9.2 thousand to PhP11.4 thousand per metric ton over the same period. 
Among agricultural crops, sugar has been one of the highly protected commodities in the 
Philippines. It has the highest NPR among key agricultural crops. There are two interesting periods that 
need to be highlighted with regard to sugar. Before the end of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1974, 
nearly all domestic production of sugar was exported to the U.S. The high NPR during this period was in 
effect an income transfer from U.S. consumers to Filipino domestic sugar producers. However, after the 
end of the Agreement when a large part of local production was consumed domestically, the high NPR of 
sugar shifted the burden to Filipino consumers and food processors. In both periods, Filipino domestic 
sugar producers benefitted from high NPR (David, Intal and Balisacan, 2007). 
After 2000, although the NPR of sugar is generally high, it fluctuated considerably.  It declined to 
73 percent in 2001, but surged to 111 percent in the following year. The NPR dropped to the lowest level 
of 2 percent in 2006, but again surged to 80 percent in 2007. The wide swing in the NPR of sugar was due 
to the erratic movement of the world price of sugar. The domestic wholesale price of sugar however was 
not as fluctuating as the world price of sugar. 
Because of export tax and export ban, the NPR of coconut (copra and coconut oil) is negative. 
This has adverse effects on coconut farmers. The devaluation in the 1970s and the world commodity 
boom did not translate into higher profits for coconut farmers. Instead, the export tax resulted in high 
revenues for the government and the export ban lower raw material costs for the coconut oil milling 
industry. These policies were eliminated beginning in 1986. However, the continued existence of a 
government corporation at present that controls 70 to 80 percent of the coconut oil milling implies that the 
government retains its control over domestic prices of copra. 
The producers of chicken broilers were highly protected in the earlier years until the second half 
of the 1980s. During these years, the NPR of chicken was generally above 100 percent. Although the 
NPR of chicken declined in the 1990s, the levels were still above 50 percent.   
The world price of chicken has not increased significantly except in 2007. It was the depreciation 
of the Philippine currency from 2000 to 2005 that resulted in the drop in the NPR of chicken during these 
years. In 2007, the NPR of chicken was 27 percent. 
The NPRs of both beef and pork were negative in the 1970s. They became positive in the 1980s 
and surged to higher levels in the 1990s. While the NPR of beef declined, the NPR of pork remained very 
high at present. 
Before the mid-1980s, the NPRs of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, 
and farm machineries was generally higher compared with the NPRs of agricultural crops except sugar 
(Table 10). This was largely due to the government’s industrial promotion policies, which increased 
domestic prices of manufactured inputs to agriculture. However, after this period and during the trade 
liberalization, there was a substantial reduction in the NPRs of agricultural inputs. From 2000 to 2004, the 
NPRs of agricultural inputs were at a uniform 3 percent.  12 
 
Table 10. Nominal protection rate for agricultural inputs (%) 
Inputs  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Fertilizer 
/a/           
Urea  49 55  -13 28 21 11  5  3.4  3 
Amorphous  17 32 -9 54 19 15 12  3  3 
Pesticide 
/b/  24 24 29 35 35 20 16  7.2 
/c/ 3 
Tractors 
/b/            
2-wheel  24 20 21 24 24 12 10 10  3 
4-wheel  24 20 21 24 24 12 10 10  3 
Threshers 
/b/  24 24 24 24 24 30 22 10  3 
Water pumps 
/b/ 46 46 46 46 46 30 24 10  3 
Source: David, Intal, and Balisacan (2007) 
/a/ Based on price comparison, i.e., the percentage difference between the ex-warehouse price and the CIF import unit value, 
where CIF is cost, insurance and freight. 
/b/ Based on book tariff rates. Implicit tariff from 1960-1984 includes the import tariff and advance sale tax (10 percent and 25 
percent) mark-up respectively. The advance sale tax was abolished in 1986 and hence the implicit tariffs from 1985 onwards 
includes tariff rate only.  
/c/ This refers to insecticide 
Agricultural Sector 
This section gives an overview of Philippine agriculture. It reviews the pattern of public expenditure on 
agriculture. It highlights the performance of the National Food Authority (NFA), which is a major 
agricultural institution that monitors the developments in food supply in the Philippines. This section also 
discusses a major agricultural program—the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Program 
(AFMP)—and a specific rice program designed to increase productivity—the Hybrid Rice 
Commercialization Program (HRCP). It highlights the cost of HRCP and the design and performance of 
the program. 
Public Expenditure on Agriculture, 2000–2005 
The budget of the whole Department of Agriculture (DA) is composed of three major items: The Office 
of the Secretary (OSEC); other DA attached agencies and corporations, of which the National Food 
Authority (NFA) is one of them; and the Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization Program (AFMP). 
There have been major shifts in public expenditure on agriculture. In 2000, OSEC was a major item in the 
overall expenditure, accounting for 71.3 percent of the total (Table 11). However, after the 
implementation of the AFMP in 2001, the budget was reallocated from OSEC to AFMP. Thus, 
expenditure in OSEC declined from PhP14.8 billion in 2000 to PhP2.5 billion in 2002. From 2002 to 
2005, the budget allocated to OSEC remained within PhP2 to PhP3 billion, whereas the allocation to 
AFMP was more than P10 billion annually. We take note of this because in the Appendix we argue that 
the green box payments and special differential treatment in the domestic support can be approximated by 
the AFMP’s budget. 
Another notable pattern is the expenditure of other DA–attached agencies and corporations, of 
which the National Food Authority (NFA) is a major entity. There was a spike in public expenditure of 
these agencies, increasing from PHP2.9 billion in 2002 to PhP12 billion in 2003. This increase was 
largely due to a budget allocation for the NFA, which has been in financial distress. The NFA allocation 
increased from PhP1 billion in 2002 to PHP10.7 billion in 2003. It declined to PhP4.9 billion in 2004, but 
surged again to PnP12.9 billion in 2005. 13 
 
Table 11. Total public expenditure on agriculture 
DA  Agencies  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  PhP million 
Office of the Secretary (OSEC)    14,783      2,447      3,565       2,818       3,183      2,329 
Other DA attached agencies and corporations      5,949      4,636      2,864     12,014       6,527    14,458 
National Food Authority (NFA)      2,000      2,586         960     10,742       4,938    12,941 
Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Program (AFMP)           -      15,864    13,309     10,064     10,178    13,565 
Total 
/a/    20,732    22,947    19,737     24,897     19,888    30,352 
Total public expenditure on agriculture as percent of: 
National  government  expenditure  3.2 3.2 2.5 3.0 2.2 3.2 
Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
GDP-agriculture,  fishery  and  forestry  4.1 4.2 3.6 4.2 3.1 4.1 
Source: Department of Budget and Management and National Income Accounts, various issues 
Note: /a/ Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the components of AFMP. 
On the whole, however, the overall public expenditure on agriculture in the Philippines is not 
substantial, accounting for only about 3 percent of the total government expenditure. Public expenditure 
represents about 0.6 percent of GDP and 4 percent of agricultural GDP. A recent World Bank technical 
working paper (World Bank, 2007) on public expenditure in Philippine agriculture found that there is a 
relative underspending on agriculture in the country by international comparison. In terms of GDP, 
Philippine spending on agriculture is comparable to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam; 
it is lower than other middle-income countries, such as China and Thailand. This underspending is mainly 
due to the fiscal constraints in the Philippines and the country’s limited financial capability, as indicated 
by low tax ratios relative to middle- and high-income developing countries.  
Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization Act 
A major policy shift in agriculture policy took place when the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization 
Act (AFMA) was approved by the Philippine Congress in 1997. AFMA is based on a plan that has five 
broad objectives: (a) food security; (b) poverty alleviation and social equity; (c) income enhancement and 
profitability, especially for farmers and fisherfolk; (d) global competitiveness; and (e) sustainability 
(Republic Act 8435). AFMA was implemented through AFMP in 2001, when the government started 
allocating budget for the program from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). When President Arroyo 
took over the administration in 2001, various programs were carried out under the AFMA, including the 
Ginintuang Masaganang Ani
3 (GMA) programs in rice, corn, coconut, sugar, high-value commercial 
crops, livestock, and fisheries. In 2003, the AFMA was amended by the Philippine Congress to further 
strengthen the expected impact of the Act. The amendment included exemptions for enterprises engaged 
in agriculture from paying tariffs and import duties on importations of all types of agriculture and 
fisheries inputs until 2015. These items include imports of chemicals, seeds, machinery, and equipment. 
Table 12 shows the breakdown of the expenditure on the AFMP by major commodity groups. 
Because of the preoccupation on food security concerns, the budget allocation process gives a 
disproportionate share to rice production. In fact, in the development plan of the Philippine economy for 
the period 2004-10, one of the primary objectives was to make food plentiful at affordable prices. The 
government equates the overall concern for food to rice sufficiency. Thus, the World Bank (2007) study 
finds that from 2001 to 2005, rice gets almost 60 percent share of the budget, while agricultural 
commodities only share less than 10 percent. In contrast, government funding for exportable agricultural 
crops has been quite modest.  
                                                 
3 Which means ‘Golden and Bountifully Harvest”.  14 
 
Table 12. Distribution of expenditure by commodity groups (%) 
Commodity  groups  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rice        39.1         53.8        59.0        53.2        56.6         58.0 
Non-rice        11.5         12.6          8.3          7.5          9.6           8.7 
Livestock          6.5           8.2          5.7          4.4          5.3           4.2 
Fisheries          9.2         12.3        14.0        16.6        13.7           8.5 
Other commodities        33.7         13.1        13.0        18.2        14.9         20.6 
Total      100.0       100.0      100.0      100.0      100.0       100.0 
Source: "Philippines: Agriculture Public Expenditure Review"; Technical Working Paper 40493. World Bank, 2007. 
National Food Authority 
The public budget allocation to agriculture is geared toward food self-sufficiency, particularly to rice 
sufficiency. The government sets a system of price support to assist rice farmers and imposes a price 
ceiling to help consumers. It procures rice from farmers, controls imports, and maintains buffer stocks to 
stabilize supply and prices. Furthermore, it minimizes seasonal price variations in different regions. The 
government also monopolizes rice importation and exportation. These interventions are implemented 
through the NFA.  
The NFA’s procurement of palay has declined considerably; from more than 10 percent of total 
production in the early 1980s to 0.5 percent in 2005 (Table B.2 in the Appendix). A key reason for this 
decline is the financial difficulty currently faced by the NFA.
4 However, the NFA remains heavily 
involved in rice importation. From 1998 to 2006, the NFA’s rice imports accounted for about 15 percent 
of rice production. In addition to rice, the NFA is also involved in corn, though its influence on this 
market has recently declined to almost zero. 
The fiscal cost of the government’s program on rice self-sufficiency is substantial, as reflected in 
the NFA’s surging financial deficit. From 2000 to 2005, the NFA’s cumulative deficit amounted to P44.2 
billion (Table 13). In 2005, its deficit of P10 billion was almost half the total deficit of all government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs)
5. In 2006, the deficit further deteriorated to P16.4 billion. 
Table 13. Deficit of the National Food Authority (PhP million) 
   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 2006
Deficit of NFA 
/a/ –1,897 –2,274 –8,086 –3,689 –1,836 –9,978 –16,430
Total deficit of monitored GOCCs 
/b/ –19,160 –24,540 –46,360 –65,320 –85,410  –21,700 —
Ratio (%): NFA deficit/Total deficit of GOCCs  9.9 9.3 17.4 5.6 2.1  46.0  —
Source: Department of Finance 
Note: /a/ National Food Authority; /b/ Government-owned and controlled corporations 
Table 14 shows the NFA’s financial statement, including the current subsidies from the national 
government. In 2005, the subsidy was more than PhP13 billion. Despite the subsidies from the national 
government, the deficit of the NFA remained substantial. Thus, the net domestic bank credit of the NFA 
increased considerably.  
                                                 
4 There are also claims that some rice farmers are hesitant to sell to the NFA. They fear that their credit history during the 
Green Revolution credit program of the 1970s might be revived once they transact with the government. 
5 All GOCCs both in agriculture and non-agriculture. 15 
 
Table 14. Financial performance of the National Food Authority (PhP million) 
Financial  accounts  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total  receipts  22,688 14,408 19,472 17,136 25,239 40,591 30,369 
Operating receipts  21,523  12,480  19,176 16,886 24,387 40,375 30,101 
Sales of goods and services  21,523  12,390 18,256 15,964 19,806 27,204 25,290 
Current subsidies   0  90  920  922  4,581  13,171  4,811 
Other receipts  1,165  1,928 296 250 852 216 268 
Current expenditures  28,474  15,342  23,742 24,765 31,493 46,664 44,041 
Operating expenditures  22,768  11,138 19,596 18,810 26,339 40,846 37,625 
Other  operating  expenditures  5,706 4,204 4,146 5,955 5,154 5,818 6,416 
Interest  payments  1,430 1,718 1,471 1,964 2,748 3,186 3,927 
Others  4,276 2,486 2,675 3,991 2,406 2,632 2,489 
Internal cash generation  -5,786  -934 -4,270 -7,629 -6,254 -6,073  -13,672 
Capital expenditures 
/a/  -3,888 1,341 3,815  -3,939  -4,418 3,905 2,758 
Financing  deficit  (-1)/surplus(+)  1,898 2,275 8,085 3,690 1,836 9,978  16,430 
Net  domestic  financing  1,898 2,578 8,085 3,840 1,853 9,996  16,497 
Net domestic bank credits  -89  3,244  8,109  -311  107  5,732  17,328 
            Net other domestic financing  1,987  -666  -24  4,151  1,746  4,264  -831 
Net external financing  0  -303  0  -150  -17  -18  -67 
Source: Department of Finance 
Note: /a/ major component is changes in inventories 
The subsidy from the national government is expected to surge because of the rice crisis in 2008. 
The subsidy will not be enough to finance the growing deficit of the NFA. The indebtedness of the NFA 
will therefore continue to increase. Because stability in the rice market has significant political 
ramifications in the Philippines, the government will be forced to absorb NFA’s debt, and will therefore 
put further pressure on the national government’s current very tight fiscal constraint. 
The Hybrid Rice Commercialization Program 
The primary objective of government’s policy on rice is how to improve productivity through the 
introduction of a new technology called the hybrid rice. The hybrid rice technology is the result of cross 
breeding of two different parental lines to produce the hybrid rice seeds.  Genetically, the hybrid seed 
(called F1) will have superior characteristics and will have yield advantage over its best parent. This 
phenomenon is called hybrid vigor (or “heterosis”). However, the crop produced from the hybrid seeds 
(F2) will have significantly diminished hybrid vigor.  Thus, it is not economically efficient to reuse seeds 
from hybrid rice because the yield will drop sharply.  
Research on hybrid rice in the Philippines was initiated in 1993. In 2001, the government adopted 
the Hybrid Rice Commercialization Program (HRCP). To improve palay productivity under the program, 
the government aggressively pursues a two-pronged approach: (a) it encourages production of hybrid 
seeds; and (b) it gives incentives to farmers to increase the adoption of hybrid seeds.  
David (2006) conducted a comprehensive look at the HRCP and evaluated the program’s 
performance, budgetary cost, profitability to farmers, adoptability, and viability in the long-run. In terms 
of the program’s budgetary cost, David found that accounting for the direct and indirect costs of the 
hybrid promotion program is not straightforward. The source of information that is explicitly available is 
the planning budget of the GMA Rice Program—one of the DA’s key programs that is funded as a lump 
sum allocation under OSEC. The DA is flexible in reallocating budget resources approved by the 
Philippine Congress in order to increase the allocation to rice programs. Also, the OSEC has realigned to 
the rice program funding sources from foreign grants and surpluses from other DA-attached entities. 
Outside the DA, there are several other sources of funds that support the HRCP. For example, some of the 16 
 
financial resources of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) were used to support the program. In 
addition, resources of a number of local government units (LGUs) and of several Congress members from 
their discretionary Priority Development Assistance Funds (PDAFs) have been used to subsidize hybrid 
seeds and other related agricultural inputs. 
The HRCP requires huge financial resources and has relied heavily on government subsidies. 
David (2006) has estimated that the government poured in sizeable resources amounting to PhP10 billion 
between 2001 and 2005 to support the HRCP program. Table 15 shows the breakdown of David’s (2006) 
estimates of the financial resources used in the rice program between 2001 and 2005. The DA’s GMA 
Rice Program was the largest source of funds, amounting to PhP6.5 billion. This amount includes 
procurement of hybrid seeds, support to seed growers, subsidies for other inputs, research and 
development, techno-demo farms, salary supplements for LGU staff, and other expenses. 
Table 15. Estimated budgetary outlays for HRCP in 2001-05 (PhP billion) 
Budget source  Budget 
DA GMA rice program                             6.47  
Local government units   
Personnel                             1.20  
Procurement/distribution                             0.75  
PDAF (Congressional pork barrel)                             1.00  
DAR                             0.50  
Total                             9.92  
Source: David (2006) 
Notes: DA = Department of Agriculture 
GMA = Ginintuang Masaganang Ani ("Golden and Bountiful Harvest") 
PDAF = Priority Development Assistance Funds (Congressional pork barrel) 
DAR = Department of Agrarian Reform 
The LGU contributions include the time their agricultural staff spent on seed distribution, 
farmer’s training and technical assistance, program planning, monitoring, and reporting. Based on certain 
assumptions made by David (2006), this amounted to PhP1.2 billion. The LGUs also procured hybrid 
seeds and other agricultural inputs for distribution to farmers, which cost them about PhP0.8 billion. 
Several members of Congress designated some of their PDAF allocation to support the program. For 
example, in 2003, close to PhP400 million of the PDAF was used for agricultural-related inputs, such as 
hybrid seeds, fertilizers, foliars, soil conditioners, and others. Another PhP300 million was disbursed in 
2004. For 2001–2005, the total funds from the PDAF amounted to PhP1 billion. In 2004, the DAR used 
about PhP500 million from the Agrarian Reform Funds to finance distribution of hybrid seeds and other 
subsidized inputs. All of this totaled to about PhP10 billion of government finances to promote the 
HRCP. 
How does the system of government seed procurement and subsidies work under the HRCP? To 
provide incentives to hybrid seed producers, the government buys the hybrid seeds at a guaranteed price 
of PhP2,400 per 20-kilogram bag of seeds. To encourage farmers to replace their inbred seeds with hybrid 
seeds, the government sells the hybrid seeds at half the price during purchase, with the remainder to be 
paid after harvest. Furthermore, if the seeds are paid for in cash during purchase, farmers get an additional 
discount of PhP200 per bag. However, based on past experience, the farmers’ nonrepayment of the 
remaining PhP1,200 per bag of seeds is extremely high, which essentially means that the government 
only recovers between PhP1,000 and PhP1,200 per bag of seeds that it buys from the seed growers at 
PhP2,400. This does not cover other distributional and transaction costs of seeds that result from the 
government picking up, storing, and distributing the seeds. 
To further encourage farmers to adopt hybrid seeds, the government provides additional subsidies 
for other farm inputs. For example, farmers who adopt hybrid seeds are entitled to a PhP500 discount on 
chemical fertilizers for every bag of hybrid seeds purchased. In addition, some amounts of chemicals, 17 
 
such as zinc sulfate, organic fertilizers, foliar fertilizer, and soil conditioners, are distributed for free for 
every bag of hybrid seeds obtained by a farmer. Based on the estimates of David (2006), the government 
provides PhP1,000 of additional subsidies per bag to encourage each farmer to adopt the hybrid seeds. 
How has the HRCP performed so far? David (2006) estimated the yield advantage of hybrid rice 
over inbred rice using country-wide data collated by the Department of Agriculture (DA). The estimates 
are presented in Table 16. The estimates show that in a number of rice seasons, hybrid seeds have yield 
advantage over inbred seeds by an average of more than 30 percent, or an additional of more than a ton 
per hectare. The highest yield difference between hybrid and inbred was 55 percent during the dry season 
of 2002
6. However, the yield difference dropped significantly thereafter.    
Table 16. National average yield of hybrid and inbred in irrigated areas 
/a/ 
   Average yield (t/ha) 
/b/ Yield  advantage 
Season Hybrid  Inbred  t/ha  Percent 
Wet 2001  5.5  4.3  1.2  27.9 
Dry 2002  6.8  4.4  2.4  54.5 
Wet 2002  5.8  4.5  1.3  28.9 
Dry 2003  6.1  4.6  1.5  32.6 
Wet 2003  6.0  4.6  1.4  30.4 
Dry 2004  6.1  4.7  1.4  29.8 
Wet 2004  5.6  4.6  1.0  21.7 
Source: David (2006) 
Notes: /a/ in irrigated areas. Inbred seeds are certified 
/b/ t/ha = ton per hectare 
However, while on average the yield advantage of hybrid over inbred is high using country-wide 
data, the high yield advantage is not uniform across rice fields in the Philippines. The yield advantage 
varies significantly across rice farms. This can be observed in the farm-level data of yield performance of 
hybrid and inbred in a number of rice provinces in Table 17. Hybrid has significant yield advantage over 
inbred in Kalinga, Laguna during the wet season of 2003, Mindoro Oriental, Camarines Sur, Bohol in the 
wet season of 2003, Negros Oriental, Leyte, and Agusan del Sur in the wet season of 2003. However, this 
is not the case in Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, Quezon, Iloilo, Davao del Norte, and Agusan del Norte. Thus, 
David (2006) concluded that based on farm-level survey, hybrid seeds have yield advantage over inbred 
only in three out of fifteen sample provinces. “In most cases, there was no statistical difference in yields 
between hybrid and inbred varieties even though yield advantage may seem high because of wide 
variations in farm yields for both hybrid and inbred adoptors. In some provinces, hybrid varieties even 
had lower average yields than inbred. With one exception, yield advantage is statistically significant only 
when the difference in average yields between hybrid and inbred reach 1 ton per hectare or more.” (David 
2006, p 38).   
                                                 
6 There are two production seasons in the Philippines: wet and dry season. However, the wet and dry seasons in the North do 
not coincide with the seasons in the South. Below is the rice planting and harvesting seasons in the Philippines: 
 Season                                        Planting                         Harvesting  
Wet season, North                       May-July                       October-December 
Dry season, North                        January-March              May-June 
Wet season, South                       October-December        March-May 
Dry season, South                        May-June                      November-December 18 
 
Table 17. Average yield of hybrid rice and yield advantage over inbred rice 
         Yield advantage 
  Average yield (t/ha) 
/a/ t/ha  percent 
Province  Dry  2002 Wet  2003 Dry  2002 Wet  2003 Dry  2002 Wet  2003 
Kalinga 6.3  5.3  1.74  1.05  38***  25*** 
Isabela 5.8  5  0.64  -21  13  -4 
Nueva  Vizcaya  3.5  4.2 0 0 0 0 
Laguna 4  4.6  -0.28  1.02  -6  29* 
Quezon 2.9  3.1  -0.28  0.09  -9  3 
Mindoro Oriental  5.5  5.6  1.7  1.86  45***  50 
Albay 5.7  4.8  0.49  0.42  9  9 
Camarines Sur  4.6  4.3  0.71  0.53  18  14 
Iloilo 1  4.4  -2.35  0.75  -70  -14 
Bohol 3.3  4.3  -0.06  0.63  -2  17 
Negros Oriental  3.6  3.5  0.56  0.7  18  25 
Leyte 4.3  4.2  1.04  0.64  32***  18** 
Davao del Norte  4.2  4.2  -0.13  -0.02  -3  -0.6 
Agusan del Sur  4.7  3.6  0.06  0.5  -1  16 
Agusan del Norte  2.6  2.7  0.22  0.01  -8  0.4 
Source: David (2006) 
Note: *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
No asterisk means difference is not statistically significant 
/a/ t/ha = ton per hectare 
Despite the huge financial resources from the government through various subsidies, the 
performance of the HRCP has not been very encouraging so far as. Table 18 shows the target areas for the 
implementation of the program between 2001 and 2005, and the area planted with hybrid seeds during dry 
and wet seasons. The area targeted for hybrid rice increased significantly both during the wet and dry 
seasons. The area planted to hybrid rice as a percent of targeted area was more than 50 percent. However, 
in terms of the total area of rice land in the Philippines, the area planted to hybrid rice is small – about 6 
percent in wet season and 5 percent in dry season.  
Table 18. Implementation of HRCP 
   Season 
Area Dry  Wet 
Target areas (has
) /a/    
2001  —              20,665  
2002               13,087               31,699  
2003               49,629               93,687  
2004               92,706             182,625  
2005             251,060             224,820  
Area planted to hybrid (has)      
2001  —                5,472  
2002                 7,078               21,301  
2003               25,521               54,691  
2004               77,982             131,790  
2005             186,329             138,709  
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Table 18. Continued 
   Season 
Area Dry  Wet 
Percent of target area (%)     
2001  — 26.5 
2002 54.1  67.2 
2003 51.4  58.4 
2004 84.1  72.2 
2005 74.2  61.7 
Percent of total rice area (%)     
2001  — 0.2 
2002 0.4  0.9 
2003 1.6  2.3 
2004 4.7  5.5 
2005  10.9 (5.0) /b/  5.8 
Source: David (2006) 
Notes: /a/ has = hectares 
/b/ Figure in (  ) is the estimated % of total rice area using seeds based on the first semester Rice and Corn Production Survey of 
the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. 
This adoption rate seems to be very small relative to the massive support from the government. 
One reason behind this low performance is the very high drop-out rate of farmers who participated in the 
program. David (2006) compiled data of farmers who participated in the program using information 
across municipalities in the country. The drop-out rate refers to the number of farmers who participated in 
the program but reverted back to growing inbred in the following season. Table 19 shows the average 
drop-out rate. The drop-out rate during the dry season of 2002 was 68 percent, but it increased to 80 
percent in the wet season of 2002 and dry of 2003. The drop-out rate slightly declined in the wet season 
of 2003 and dry of 2004, but surged again to 86 percent in the wet season of 2004.  
Table 19. Distribution of sample municipalities by drop-out rate (%) /a/ 
Municipality/drop-out rate  Dry 2002  Wet 2002  Dry 2003  Wet 2003  Dry 2004  Wet 2004 
Number  of  municipalities  8 18 25 37 48 38 
Average drop-out rate  68  80  80  67  69  86 
Source: David (2006) 
Note: /a/ Figures under Wet 2004, for example, refer to percentage of farmers in the season who did not grow hybrid rice in the 
succeeding dry season in the succeeding dry season of 2005. 
There are several reasons why the drop-out rate is high. Based on the hybrid rice factsheet 
provided by the Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific (PAN AP, 2007), some of the major 
reasons why the drop-out rate is high are:  
1.  Hybrid rice seeds are expensive. The cost of unsubsidized hybrid rice seeds is PhP2,400 per 
20-kilo bag versus the average cost of certified inbred seeds of PhP1,400 per similar bag. A 
number of factors contribute to the high cost of hybrid rice seeds production. (a)  Hybrid rice 
seeds are partially open and therefore susceptible to seed-borne insect pest diseases especially 
under the humid tropical conditions in the Philippines. Under such conditions, hybrid rice 
seeds would require cold dry storage facilities which are uneconomical and very expensive 
for seed growers to maintain. (b) Hybrid rice seed production is expensive because it is labor, 
input and knowledge intensive. Compared to normal mechanized rice cultivation, hybrid rice 
seeds production requires additional 50 man-days/hectare. The production of hybrid rice 20 
 
seeds depends heavily on gibberellic acid, which is a growth regulator required to 
synchronize the flowering of the hybrid seed parents. Furthermore, hybrid rice seeds 
cultivation requires more fertilizers than ordinary inbred rice production  
2.  Despite the yield advantage of hybrid rice seed over inbred in some rice farm lands in the 
Philippines, net income for farmers are lower because of higher cost of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticide, and farm labor wage. 
3.  Hybrid rice cannot be reused as seeds during the subsequent cropping season because the 
yield will deteriorate sharply. Thus, it is uneconomical for farmers to save some of the hybrid 
rice. Farmers are forced to purchase expensive new seeds every cropping season. 
Another feature of the HRCP observed by David (2006) is that about half of the market for hybrid 
rice seeds is controlled by a single supplier. Thus, the guaranteed price of hybrid rice seeds paid by the 
government largely benefits this single supplier.  
Table 20 shows comparative cost and revenue of seed and rice production of hybrid and inbred 
rice. This cost comparison is based on the procurement price of hybrid seeds of PhP2,400 per 20-kilo bag. 
The net return of hybrid seed production is more than PhP63,000 per hectare. In contrast, inbred seed 
growers only realize about PhP35,000 per hectare. On the other hand, the return of hybrid rice famers is 
about PhP20,000 per hectare. The net return of inbred rice farmers is about PhP15,000 per hectare.  
Table 20. Profitability of hybrid and inbred seed production and rice production (PhP/ha) 
   Seed Production       
 Hybrid    Rice dry 2004 
Cost/revenue 1 
/a/   2 
/b/ Inbred 
/b/ Hybrid    Inbred 
/b/ 
Yield (kg/ha) 
/c/             1,000                735             4,977             5,355             4,993  
Gross revenue         120,280         100,329           67,689           48,098           41,762  
Cost of production           55,095           47,220           32,340           28,209           26,925  
Gross revenue less           
cost of production           63,185           63,109           35,324           19,889           14,838  
Cost per kilo                     63                  65                    7     
Source: David (2006) 
Notes: /a/ Average of cost and returns data of cooperatives assuming average yields of F1 seeds of 1 ton/hectare for Isabela 
(ISGMPC for dry 2004, Roxas for wet 2004, San Manuel for wet 2004), Cagayan (CSPMC for wet 2004), and Kalinga (Tabuk 
for dry 2004). 
/b/ Based on sample of farms in 5 provinces (Isabela, Nueva Ecija, Iloilo, Davao del Sur, Davo del Norte) reported in the 
Sikap/Strive Foundation and PhilRice (2005) study. 
/c/ kg/ha = kilo per hectare 
Table 21 shows four major producers of hybrid rice seeds. Various cooperatives produce three 
types of hybrid rice seeds (Mestizo 1, 2, and 3). SL Agritech produces SL 8. Bayer Crop Science 
produces Tisoy and Bigante. Masanto produces Magilas. The share of the various cooperatives in the 
market of hybrid rice seeds increased from 43 percent in the wet season of 2003 to 69 percent in the dry 
season of 2004, but the share dropped to 47 percent in the dry season of 2005. The share of SL Agritech, 
which is a single domestic company, increased from 41 percent in the wet season of 2003 to 44 percent in 
the dry season of 2005. The market share of Bayer Crop Science is about 10 percent.  21 
 
Table 21. Hybrid rice seeds, procured/subsidized (in bags) 
/a/ 
Seed producer  Wet 2003  Dry 2004  Dry 2005 
Cooperatives          30,201       146,962          99,221 
Mestizo 1           26,064           89,259            58,009 
Mestizo 2  —            1,219              1,395 
Mestizo 3             4,137           56,484            39,817 
SL Agritech         29,138         48,807          93,611 
SL8           29,138           48,807            93,611 
Bayer Crop Science           9,098         17,211          20,164 
Tisoy                582             2,266   —
Bigante 
/b/             8,516           14,945            20,164 
Monsanto           2,126                  —                    —   
Magilas             2,126                 —                   —   
Total         70,563       212,980        212,996 
Source: David (2006) 
Notes: /a/ As of August 2004 
/b/ Bigante which comes in 15kg/bag is considered equivalent to the 20kg/bag for all others. 
David (2006) has also noted that Bigante seeds of Bayer Crop Science are not produced locally. 
They are imported from India. Bigante receives the lowest price guarantee from the government, yet 
Bayer Crop Science survives and still captures 10 percent of the market. Based on this, David (2006) has 
argued that it is not necessary to grow locally the hybrid rice seeds where the cost of production is very 
high. The seeds can be developed elsewhere under similar tropical production conditions in the 
Philippines, but with lower cost of production. In fact, given the natural and economic conditions in the 
Philippines, the country is less competitive in hybrid rice seed production than rice cultivation. 
The implementation of the present rice productivity program through the HRCP has major flaws. 
It is costly and not sustainable. It cannot survive without large amount of government support. The 
government cannot sustain the support to HRCP indefinitely because the budget allocation to program 
plus the widening deficit of the National Food Authority will create a large dent on government resources. 
The government is faced with a very tight budget constraint. Furthermore, the massive subsidies provided 
by the government to implement the program only distorts farmers’ choice among different variety of 
rice, especially between inbred and hybrid rice (David 2006). 
The government should therefore stop the present costly and inefficient system of subsidies in the 
HRCP (David 2006). Instead, the government should divert its resources to supporting research and 
development activities that are focused on inbred varieties. “Rather than promote costly technologies such 
as hybrid rice, a more responsive approach in addressing rice productivity problems is to enhance inbred-
based seed system with farmer’s practice of saving, re-using and exchanging seeds. National governments 
should instead focus their meager resources on sustainable initiatives that ensure farmers’ participation in 
technology developments such as Participatory Plant Breeding Programs and at the same time, focus on 
other factors that cause yield constraints.” (PAN, AP 2007, p 5).  
In sum, section 2 describes the structure and policies in Philippine agriculture. While the trade 
sector in the Philippines has gone through a series of reforms since the 1980s, the trade protection on 
agriculture, particularly on key food items, is still high. Furthermore, the policy focus of the government 
in agriculture is on rice. It is currently implementing a rice productivity program through the adoption of a 
new technology on hybrid rice seeds. However, the results of the program so far are not encouraging.  
Will the current agricultural domestic support in the Philippines violate the agreements set in the 
WTO? The next section will put the discussion on Philippine agriculture domestic support within the 
context to the WTO agreements.   22 
 
3.  AGRICULTURAL DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN WTO CONTEXT 
The current basis for the continuing multilateral negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda (Doha 
Round) for global agricultural trade is the WTO’s July 2004 Agricultural Framework. This framework 
identified three “pillars” for negotiations, based on the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA): market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. In this paper, we focus on domestic 
support issues within the context of Philippine agriculture.  
The idea under the WTO is to reduce trade-distorting subsidies through a set of agreed-upon 
expenditure limits (or commitments). Subsidies are classified by the degree of distortion through colored 
boxes. The “green box” contains domestic subsidies that do not distort trade, or at most only result in 
minimal distortion. Payments that fall under this box include outlays for public activities (such as 
agricultural research and extension), conservation and the environment, rural development, food security 
stocks, domestic food aid (such as food stamps), farm disaster payments, and structural adjustment 
programs. Also included in this box are decoupled payments, or payments that are not linked to current 
production decisions or prices, such as commodity direct payments. These types of payments are referred 
to as “green” in the traffic-light sense, because countries can proceed with these expenditures without 
limit. 
Payments under the production-limiting programs are also exempt from the limits. These 
payments are classified under the “blue box.” For crops, these are payment programs on fixed area and 
yield based on no more than 85 percent of a fixed base–period production. For livestock production, these 
are payment programs that are tied to a fixed number of livestock. 
Payments under the “amber box” are at the core of the URAA disciplines and Doha Round 
negotiations. There are imposed limits on the amount of subsidy payments under this box, and the 
payment limits are reduced over time. These payments are largely trade distorting, such as market price 
support (MPS) and production-related subsidies to farmers. However, within the amber box, small 
amounts of subsidy payments are allowed, regardless of the nature of the subsidy payments. These 
payments are called the de minimis exemptions. For developed countries, product-specific de minimis 
support cannot exceed 5 percent of the total value of production of a basic agricultural product during a 
relevant year. There is also a second category of non-product-specific support with a de minimis limit of 5 
percent of the total value of agricultural production. For developing countries, the de minimis supports 
cannot exceed 10 percent. In addition, under another provision of the URAA, developing countries are 
allowed to exempt as “special and differential treatment” investment and input subsidies that are part of 
development programs. For the developed and developing countries, all support payments that fail to 
qualify for exemption are added up in what is called the total aggregate measure of support (AMS). The 
total AMS should not exceed a certain limit, though this limit varies across countries. For example, the 
limits specified in the Uruguay Round Agreement indicate that the United States cannot exceed US$19.1 
billion in the total AMS, and the European Union cannot exceed US$83.3 billion (67.2 billion euros). The 
Philippines does not have total AMS commitment. Consequently, its non de minimis AMS is constrained 
to zero. However, the Philippines is subject to the 10 percent de minimis exception, which provides a 
category for its support. 
The rules and procedures for computing the market price support as part of the AMS have 
ambiguities, which could be a potential source of disagreement. These ambiguities stem from the use of 
fixed external reference prices and from the vague definition of eligible production. In computing the 
MPS the external reference price (which is the average of the years 1986–1988) remains fixed. If 
calculation of the AMS is expressed in domestic currency, as it is for the Philippines, the use of a fixed 
external reference price might create a problem in calculating the AMS for developing countries, where 
inflation rates are generally higher as compared with developed countries. 
The URAA is also vague in stating whether the quantity of production eligible to receive the 
administered price is total production, or only the marketed surplus that is actually sold in the market, or 
the quantity that is actually procured by the government through the price support mechanisms. Some 23 
 
countries use procurement of agricultural commodities by government agencies (such as government-
owned food corporations) as eligible production, while others consider the entire production volume of 
the commodities.  
To monitor developments in domestic support across countries, the WTO requires each member 
country to submit regular notifications. The notification requires each member to classify their support 
into the various colored boxes described above and to compute the amount of the AMS. However, 
countries do not comply with this requirement seriously. The WTO notifications, which can be 
downloaded from the WTO website, are often out of date.  
Philippine WTO Notification on Agricultural Domestic Support 
The latest submission by the Philippine government on domestic support which is available at the WTO 
website was dated August 22, 2002 (WTO, 2002). It covered the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. Table 22 is 
based on this latest submission and on the previous ones. Based on the WTO notification format, 
Philippine domestic support falls under three categories: (a) green box payments, (b) special and 
differential treatment (SDT), and (c) market price support (MPS) under the product-specific AMS. There 
are no supports under the direct payments (blue box) or under the non-product-specific AMS. Moreover, 
as noted above, the Philippines does not have total AMS limit/commitment. Thus, the de facto limit on 
domestic support for the Philippines is the de minimis level, which is 10 percent of the value of 
production of an agricultural commodity.  
In 1995, the Philippines reported a substantial amount of SDT worth P6.26 billion, almost twice 
the amount of the green box payments. Within this SDT, the largest item was investment subsidies to 
agriculture, which totaled P5.14 billion. In 1996, there was a major shift in reporting, when green box 
payments more than doubled to P7.4 billion and SDT payments dropped to P1.39 billion. Within the 
green box payments, the largest item was research, which increased more than 10 times since the previous 
year. In 1997, the reported green box payments increased dramatically to P15.18 billion, mainly due to 
the increase in support payments to research and infrastructure services. In 1998, the amount of support 
for research and infrastructure services dropped. The decline in payments to research continued in 1999, 
but for infrastructure services, it recovered significantly. From 1998 to 2000 the support for extension and 
advisory services picked up. In 2001, when the Philippines reported its last notification to the WTO, 
green box payments totaled P12.96 billion—about three times the value in 1995. On the other hand, 
payment for SDT in 2001 was P3.92 billion, which was lower than the value in 1995.  
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Table 22. Official WTO domestic support notification of the Philippines, 1995–2001 
 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Data  Source 
Green Box Payments (DS: 1), PhP thousand   3,503,735 7,398,445 15,179,120 7,625,373 9,218,826 12,960,350 12,961,350 GAA 
/g/ 
General services                 
Research 299,921 3,385,589 6,514,184 1,249,767 963,310 1,663,077 1,663,077  
Pest and disease control  19,561 42,530 87,852 46,247 73,665 91,527 92,527  
Training services  93,561 259,883 156,214 272,849 214,621 195,976 195,976  
Extension and advisory services  135,593 222,105 228,876 580,274 753,856 1,308,252 1,308,252  
Inspection services  114,687 128,094 95,411 179,647 193,987 108,301 108,301  
Marketing and promotion services  160,310 190,289 211,065 293,975 375,382 409,218 409,218  
Infrastructure services  1,630,102 2,167,378 5,995,947 3,498,469 5,396,367 7,804,416 7,804,416  
Domestic food aid  — —— — ———  
Decoupled income support  — —— — ———  
Income insurance and income safety net programs  — —— — ———  
Payments for relief from natural disasters  — —— — ———  
Structural adjustment assistance                 
Producer retirement programs  — —— — ———  
Resource retirement programs  — —— — ———  
Investment aids  — —— — ———  
Environmental programs  — —— — ———  
Regional assistance programs  — —— — ———  
Others  — —— — ———  
Public stocking for food security purposes   
Stabilization program for food items  1,000,000 924,077 1,500,000 1,449,145 1,192,638 1,241,993 1,241,993  
Payments for relief from natural disasters                 
Crop insurance  50,000 78,500 389,571 55,000 55,000 137,590 137,590  
Special and Differential Treatment (DS: 2), PhP thousand  6,264,000 1,393,977 2,107,429 1,932,303 1,584,193 3,276,479 3,917,441 DA /h/ 
Investment subsidies to agriculture 
/a/ 5,138,000 909,364 1,926,906 1,002,005 1,202,530 1,692,108 2,322,922 
Input subsidies 
/b/ 1,126,000 484,613 180,523 388,433 275,542 1,534,965 1,570,854 
Funds for agricultural investment 
/c/ 541,865 106,121 49,406 23,665 
Direct Payments Under Production-Limiting Programs (Blue Box) 
( D S :  3 )     —   —— — ———   25 
 
Table 22. Continued 
    1995  1996  1997 1998  1999 2000  2001  Data  Source 
Product-Specific AMS (DS: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)              
Market price support (DS: 5)  Applied Administered Price (PhP/kg) 
/d/  
Rice 14.00 14.00 14.00 13.20 14.67 14.62 14.62 NFA 
/i/ 
Corn 4.50 5.25 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
  Eligible Production (thousand tons) 
/e/    
Rice 27 93 65 40 364 431 310 
C o r n  0 1 2 4 0 2 0 8 080  
  Product-Specific AMS (PhP million) 
/f/    
Rice 257 877 617 347 3,683 4,337 3,122 
Corn              — 35 148 779               — 30 —  
  10% Value of Production (PhP million)   
Rice 10,312 11,603 11,148 8,775 12,067 12,812 13,465 
Corn 3,055 3,201 3,306 3,181 3,883 4,150 4,267 
Non-product-specific AMS (DS: 9)  — — — — — — —  
Source: World Trade Organization 
Notes: /a/ Soft loans and grants for agricultural investment—These involve the provision of loans and grants for irrigation and other farm infrastructure support, farm equipment, 
postharvest facilities, research development, training, and extension activities. 
/b/ Provision of access to farm inputs—This measure provides low-income resource-poor producers with the opportunity to have easier access to good-quality inputs, such as 
seeds, planting materials, fertilizers, and animal stock, in order to improve farm productivity. 
/c/ Investment credit and grants—Government funds directed to improve rural structure, acquisition of machines, equipment, and postharvest facilities 
/d/ External reference price, average 1986–1988 (PhP/kg) 
/e/ Eligible production consists of rice procured plus palay (paddy) procured converted into rice terms using a 65% milling recovery rate. 
/f/ Administered price less external reference price multiplied by eligible production. 
/g/ General Appropriations Act 
/h/ Department of Agriculture 
/i/ National Food Authority 
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The other two components under the green box are payments for a stabilization program for food 
items for food security purposes and crop insurance for relief from natural disasters. Payments for food 
security are also sizable, at more than a billion pesos, or about 10 times larger than payments for crop 
insurance. 
The Philippines reports MPS for rice and corn. The calculation of MPS is based on the external 
reference price, which was computed as the average for the period 1986–1988 and the yearly applied 
administered price. All prices are expressed in pesos per kilogram (P/kg). 
In principle, for the administered support price to be effective in helping farmers, it has to be 
above the farm gate price. However, as illustrated in the appendix, this support price was lower in 1995, 
1996, and 1998. The wholesale price of rice is higher than the administered ceiling price, which should be 
the case in order to protect consumers from price surges. The difference between the wholesale and the 
border price is the nominal protection rate. In the appendix it is also shown that administered price used in 
the WTO notification is similar or close to the rice ceiling price. This implies that the computed MPS for 
rice in the notification measures price gap closer to the level of consumers than producers. The correct 
price to use should be the support price for farmers. Thus, based on the calculation in the appendix, for 
rice, the appropriate external reference price is P4.56 per kilogram, whereas for corn, it is P2.26. The 
external reference price is subtracted from the administered price, which varies yearly, and then 
multiplied by eligible production to get the MPS value. The eligible production is defined as procurement 
by the NFA from rice and corn farmers. In the case of rice, NFA procurement is in terms of palay (rice 
paddy). In the MPS calculation, procured palay is converted into rice terms using a 65 percent recovery 
milling rate. 
The MPS for rice peaked at P4.34 billion in 2000. During that year, 10 percent of the total value 
of rice production was P12.81 billion. Therefore, the MPS was significantly below 10 percent de minimis. 
In fact, for the whole period covering 1995 to 2001, the MPS for rice was significantly lower than the 10 
percent de minimis limit. The same was true for the MPS for corn. 
Shadow Agricultural Domestic Support Notification, 2002–2008 
The official domestic support series ended in 2001, the year when the Philippine government last notified. 
In this section, we attempt to replicate the 2001 notification, using available information, in order to 
derive a method for estimating shadow agricultural domestic support notification from 2002 to 2008. This 
task, however, is not straightforward, because there is no available documentation for the 1995–2001 
notification and the items in the official sources of information do not match the items in the WTO 
notification format. We therefore had to reconcile data in the official sources with the numbers in the 
WTO notification. The Appendix provides a step-by-step discussion of the procedure that we devised and 
adopted to estimate the shadow notification. Table 23 presents our best estimates of the agricultural 
domestic support in the Philippines for 2002 to 2008, based on our replication method. 27 
 
Table 23. Shadow Philippine notification of domestic support to WTO 
    2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006  2007  2008 
Green Box Payments (DS:1), PhP thousand 11,116,133  11,426,306  6,976,505 5,889,786 8,548,733 7,314,776 10,379,016 16,345,962 
General services       
Research 996,679  971,534  662,619 803,783 645,389 668,296 966,695 1,494,573 
Pest and disease control  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Training services  2,027,955  2,172,555  648,924 378,158 2,062,295 1,125,094 1,627,456 2,516,154 
Extension and advisory services  1,190,341  903,322  731,120 479,092 473,939 602,291 871,218 1,346,960 
Inspection services  90,657  1,083,461  534,542 419,080 281,765 375,708 594,264 980,898 
Marketing and promotion services  186,549  105,798  120,682 95,056 149,182 107,061 154,864 239,430 
Infrastructure services  5,244,369  5,173,865 3,703,847 3,139,846 3,922,392 3,422,554 4,950,746 7,654,176 
Domestic food aid  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Decoupled income support  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Income insurance and income safety net programs  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Payments for relief from natural disasters  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Structural adjustment assistance                 
Producer retirement programs  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Resource retirement programs  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Investment aids  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Environmental programs  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Regional assistance programs  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Others —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Public stocking for food security purposes                 
Stabilization program for food items  1,241,993  902,000  461,000 461,000 900,000 900,000 1,100,000 2,000,000 
Payments for relief from natural disasters                 
Crop insurance  137,590  113,771  113,771 113,771 113,771 113,771 113,771 113,771 
Special and Differential Treatment (DS: 2), thousand pesos  2,618,923 2,324,120  3,627,840 3,101,661 3,133,936 2,500,627 3,617,173 5,592,385 
Investment subsidies to agriculture 
/a/ 1,283,310  1,266,057  906,340 768,328 959,818 837,507 1,211,459 1,872,995 
Input subsidies 
/b/ 1,190,243  1,053,100  2,660,113 2,212,842 2,083,522 1,590,725 2,300,994 3,557,486 
Funds for agricultural investment 
/c/ 145,370  4,963  61,387 120,491 90,596 72,395 104,720 161,904 
Direct Payments Under Production-Limiting Programs  
(Blue Box) (DS: 3)  —  —  — — — — — — 28 
 
Table 23. Continued 
    2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Product-Specific AMS (DS: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)           
Market price support (DS: 5) 
/d/  Applied Administered Price (PhP/kg)  
Rice 15.38  15.38  15.38  15.38 15.38 15.38 15.38 22.56 
Corn  6.00  6.00  6.00 6.08 7.13 8.50 8.50 9.50 
  Eligible Production (thousand tons) 
/e/  
Rice  308  195  192  135  50 48 65 130 
Corn  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Product-Specific  AMS (PhP million s) 
/f/  
Rice  3,337 2,109  2,083  1,461  538 514 704 2,341 
Corn  —  —  — — 15.8  — — — 
















Corn  4,267  3,848  3,951 5,489 4,980 6,599 7,707 9,757 
            
Non-Product-Specific AMS (DS: 9)  — — — —  — — — —
Source: Author’s calculations 
Notes: /a/ Soft loans and grants for agricultural investment—These involve the provision of loans and grants for irrigation and other farm infrastructure support, farm equipment, 
postharvest facilities, research development, training, and extension activities. 
/b/ Provision of access to farm inputs—This measure provides low-income resource-poor producers with the opportunity to have easier access to good-quality inputs, such as seeds, 
planting materials, fertilizers, and animal stock in order to improve farm productivity. 
/c/ Investment credit and grants—Government funds directed to improve rural structure, acquisition of machines, equipment, and postharvest facilities. 
/d/ Based on external reference price (average 1986–1988: rice – P4.56/kg corn – P2.26/kg) 
/e/ Eligible production consists of rice procured plus palay (paddy) procured converted into rice terms using a 0.65 milling recovery rate 
/f/ Administered price less external reference price multiplied by eligible production 
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The green box payments declined from P11.1 billion in 2001 to P5.9 billion in 2005. However, 
this trend reversed in the following year, reaching P16.35 billion by 2008. The increase was due to the 
substantial climb in expenditures on infrastructure services (P7.65 billion in 2008), training services 
(P2.53 billion), and stabilization program for food items (P2 billion). There were also notable increases in 
expenditures on research (P1.94 billion) and extension services (P1.36 billion). 
Under the SDT, investment subsidies to agriculture and input subsidies were the two major items. 
Investment subsidies to agriculture initially saw a declining trend through 2004; this trend reversed in 
2005 to reach an expenditure of P1.87 billion by 2008. There were also significant increases in input 
subsidies in 2003 (P2.66 billion) and in 2008 (P3.56 billion).  
The administered price of rice increased to P22.56 by 2008. As discussed in the appendix, starting 
in May 2008, the government has increased the support price of palay from P10 per kilogram to P17 per 
kilogram. Thus, for the whole of 2008, the average price is P14.67. The P22.56 per kilogram price 
support is in terms of rice using the 0.65 recovery rate. 
The government increased the price to encourage domestic rice production in order to minimize 
the negative impact on the domestic market of the uncertainties in the international rice market. The 
world price of rice increased from $305 per metric ton in 2006 to $361 in 2007 and to $907 in April of 
2008. Because the Philippines imports 12.4 percent (1.7 million metric tons) of its rice requirement 
annually, the price hike has had a significant effect on the domestic market.  
The NFA’s procurement of rice has remained very low due to the financial difficulties discussed 
earlier. Thus, despite the widening gap between the average external reference price of P4.56/kg and the 
administered price, the MPS for rice in 2008 was still significantly below the 10 percent de minimis limit. 
The 2008 MPS for rice was P2.34 billion, while the de minimis limit was P32.2 billion (or the MPS 92.7 
percent below the limit). 
In May 2008, the support price of corn was also increased to P10/kg. Thus, in the whole of 2008, 
the average support price was P9.50/kg. Because there was zero NFA procurement of corn, the MPS for 
corn was also zero. The de minimis limit was P9.76 billion.  
Projection of Philippine Agricultural Domestic Support 
We did not have the benefit of a rigorous econometric model for determining our projection of domestic 
support. We instead based our projections on historical trends. In projecting the agricultural domestic 
support until 2013, we applied the following assumptions: 
i.  Real GDP agriculture will grow by 4 percent per year from 2009 to 2013. Its implicit price 
deflator will also grow by 4 percent per year. This information will project nominal GDP 
agriculture. 
ii.  The average ratio between AFMP and nominal GDP agriculture from 2001 to 2008 was 
1.74. In 2009 to 2013, we assume the ratio to increase to 2 percent. The budget for the 
AFMP has been projected based on this ratio. 
iii.  The average share of green box payments in the sum of green and SDT from 2001 to 2008 
was 0.74. On the other hand, the average share of SDT in the total was 0.26. We applied 
these ratios to break down the budget for AFMP to green box payments and SDT. 
iv.  We assume the administered price of palay to remain at P17/kg in 2009. It will increase to 
P18/kg in 2011 and P19/kg in 2013. We converted the administered price into the price of 
rice using the 0.65 recovery ratio. We assume that the wholesale price of rice will follow the 
growth in the administered price of rice over these years. Furthermore, we assume 
production of palay to grow by 4 percent annually. We assume NFA rice procurement at 
130,000 metric tons annually in the projection. We derived the MPS for rice, the value of 
production, and the 10 percent de minimis limit using these projections. 
v.  We assume the administered price of corn to be set at P10/kg in 2009 and 2010. It will 
increase to P12/kg in 2011 and 2012 and to P13/kg in 2013. We assume the wholesale price 30 
 
of corn to follow this pattern. We also assume corn production to grow by 4 percent annually 
from 2009 to 2013. Because there is zero NFA procurement of corn, we retain this 
assumption until 2013. We derived the MPS for corn, the value of production, and the 10 
percent de minimis limit using these projections. 
Table 24 presents the results of this exercise. The green box payments will increase from P16.35 
billion in 2008 to P22 billion in 2013. SDT will increase from P5.59 billion in 2008 to P7.75 billion in 
2013. The MPS for rice is projected to increase from P2.3 billion in 2008 to P3.2 billion in 2013. These 
values are significantly below the de minimis limit. The MPS for corn is zero because there is no NFA 
procurement of corn. 
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Table 24. Projected Philippine agriculture domestic support 
   2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
Green box payments (DS: 1), PhP thousand  16,345,962 16,172,501 17,466,301 18,863,605 20,372,694 22,002,509
Special and differential treatment (DS: 2), PhP thousand   5,592,385 5,693,813  6,149,318 6,641,264 7,172,565 7,746,370
Direct payments under production-limiting programs (blue box) 
(DS: 3)  — —  — — — —
Product-specific AMS (DS: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)             
Market price support (DS: 5), PhP million             
Rice 2,341 2,807  2,807 3,007 3,007 3,207
Corn — —  — — — —
10% of value of production (million pesos)             
Rice 32,199 38,814  40,367 44,451 46,229 50,749
Corn 9,757 10,681  11,109 13,864 14,418 16,245
Non-product-specific AMS (DS: 9)  — —  — — — —
Source: Author’s calculations 
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4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
There have been major policy shifts in agriculture in the Philippines. Government policies in the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s were initially biased against agriculture. However, since the early 1980s, government 
policy has shifted toward protecting agriculture. The system of protection has included high tariffs and a 
nominal protection rate, as compared with the manufacturing sector, as well as high domestic support.  
Within agricultural, there are differences in protection. Rice, corn, sugar, and chicken are highly 
protected commodities. Rice is the only commodity at present that is under quantitative restriction. 
Coconut, beef, and pork have negative protection. Food manufacturing, which is largely agriculture 
based, is also highly protected. 
In this paper, we reviewed the government’s expenditure pattern in agriculture. Since 2000, there 
have been major shifts in expenditure, including a reallocation of budget to the Agriculture and Fisheries 
Modernization Program (AFMP). There was also a spike in expenditure for the Department of 
Agriculture’s attached agencies and corporations due to the infusion of P10.74 billion in funds to the 
National Food Authority (NFA) for its financial difficulties. This was followed by another infusion of 
P12.94 billion in 2005. The NFA monitors developments in the country’s supply of food, particularly rice 
and corn. 
Although the NFA will remain in financial distress, it is expected to continue to subsidize rice—
in particular, the consumer price of rice—because of the ongoing food crisis in the domestic market. The 
Philippine government has invested substantial resources to increase rice productivity through the present 
Hybrid Rice Commercialization Program (HRCP). Implementation of this program is expected to 
continue in the light of the ongoing food crisis. Estimates indicate that from 2001 to 2005, the 
government invested about P10 billion to run the program. According to some studies, the results are not 
very encouraging. The hybrid seed adoption rate of farmers remains very low at 5 percent, in part because 
the dropout rate of those who adopted hybrid seeds is high.  
Overall, government spending on agriculture is about 3 percent of total national government 
expenditure, 4 percent of agriculture GDP, and 0.6 percent of GDP. This expenditure level is low relative 
to other middle-income developing countries.  
The latest submission by the Philippine government on domestic support to the WTO which is 
available at the WTO website was dated August 22, 2002. It covered the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
Based on the WTO notification format, Philippine domestic support from 1995 to 2001 falls under three 
categories: (a) green box payments, (b) special and differential treatment (SDT), and (c) market price 
support (MPS) under the product-specific aggregate measure of support (AMS). There are no supports 
under the direct payments (blue box) or the non-product-specific AMS. Moreover, the Philippines does 
not have total AMS limit/commitment. Thus, the de facto limit on domestic support for the Philippines is 
the de minimis level, which is 10 percent of the value of production of an agricultural commodity.  
In 2001, the green box payments amounted to P12.96 billion, about three times the value in 1995. 
The major item under the green box is infrastructure services. In 2001, SDT was P3.92 billion, which was 
lower than the value in 1995. The major items in SDT are investment subsidies to agriculture and input 
subsidies.  
The market price support (MPS) for rice and corn is based on the average external reference price 
for the period 1986–1988, the yearly administered price, and eligible production. Eligible production is 
defined as NFA procurement of rice and corn. However, NFA procurement of these commodities 
remained very low. Thus, the MPS for rice and corn is significantly below the de minimis limit. 
We extended the domestic support series from 2002 to 2008 based on the replication method we 
devised and adopted. We further projected the series to 2013 based on certain assumptions. The results 
indicate that green box payments will increase from P11.43 billion in 2002 to P16.35 billion in 2008 and 
P22 billion in 2013. SDT will increase from P2.32 billion in 2002 to P5.59 billion in 2008 and P7.75 
billion in 2013. Because of very small NFA procurement of rice and zero procurement of corn, the MPS 
of rice and corn is significantly below the de minimis limit and will remain so in 2013. 33 
 
There are ambiguities in the rules and procedures for computing the MPS. These ambiguities 
stem from the use of a fixed external reference price and from the vague definition of eligible production. 
In computing the MPS, the external reference price remains fixed, at the average of the years 1986–1988. 
Because the MPS calculation is expressed in domestic currency, the use of a fixed external reference price 
may create problems in the calculation for developing countries, where inflation rates are generally higher 
as compared with developed countries; however, this is not a difficulty for the Philippines. The use of 
government procurement as eligible production may not reflect the correct level of price-distorting 
domestic support, because budget constraints usually limit government procurement of key agricultural 
commodities, as in case of the NFA. Moreover, the MPS reported in the WTO domestic support 
notifications may differ significantly from the more economically meaningful measure of nominal 
protection due to tariffs and evaluated at prevailing world prices. 
 34 
 
APPENDIX A: ESTIMATING THE GREEN BOX AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT 
There are three sources of information in the official notification: (a) the General Appropriations Act 
(GAA) of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for the green box payments; (b) the 
Department of Agriculture (DA) for the SDT payments; and (c) the NFA for the MPS (Table 13). The 
GAA includes all budget items of all sectors of government: the executive, the legislative, and the 
judiciary. Within the executive, budget items of all departments, agencies, and programs are included. 
One of the departments is the DA. The budget items related to agricultural development are in the main 
DA budget, in the budgetary support to government corporations within the DA, including the NFA, and 
in the budget items for the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA), which started in 2001 
to support the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Program (AFMP). We retraced the numbers in the 
official notification for the green box from the numbers in the GAA for agriculture. We were able to trace 
two items: stabilization program for food items and crop insurance. The first is under the budgetary 
support to government corporations for the NFA, and the second is under AFMA—in particular, under 
operations for the crop sector development.
7 The remaining items under the green box payments in the 
notification cannot be traced to the items in the GAA, perhaps because the numbers in the notification are 
sums of various items in the GAA, which we have no way of identifying because no documentation is 
available.
8  
When we compared the total of green box payments and SDT for 2001 in the notification with the 
AFMA expenditure for 2001, we observed a small difference (P16.88 billion for the former versus P15.86 
billion for the latter, or about 6 percent difference). We were therefore able to assume that the AFMA 
expenditure could be used to approximate payments for the green box and SDT. Thus, our first step was 
to gather two sets of available information: expenditure on the AFMA (Table A.1) and the utilization of 
funds for AFMA within the DA (Table A.2).  
Note that the total in Table A.2 is different from the total in Table A.1. There are two sources for 
this difference: Table A.2 is only for the DA, whereas Table A.1 covers other items outside of the main 
DA; in addition, Table A.2 is the actual utilization of funds. Thus, line 21 in Table A.2 is less than the 
value of line 2 in Table A.1, except for 2003, for which it is slightly above. 
We retained the format of Table A.2 because it is closer to the WTO notification format. Our 
second step was to incorporate the values outside of the main DA in Table A.1 into Table A.2 to come up 
with the values in Table A.3. The difference between Table A.2 and Table A.3 is in lines 7, 8, and 15. 
Line 7 in Table A.3 is equal to line 16 in Table A.1 plus line 8 in Table A.2. Line 8 in Table A.3 is equal 
to lines 11 and 13 in Table A.1 plus line 7 in Table A.2. Line 15 in Table A.3 is equal to lines 14 and 15 
in Table A.1 plus line 7 in Table A.2. The rest of the numbers are same. 
 
                                                 
7 The exact item is National Government Subsidy for Crop Insurance Premium of Subsistence Farmers Under the Crop 
Insurance Program of Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation. 
8 We met and discussed with the person in charge of WTO issues in the Department of Agriculture in Manila. He 
commented that there are no available documentations for past WTO notifications on file. The staff who had prepared the 
previous notification had already left the department. 35 
 
Table A.1. Expenditure on agriculture and fisheries modernization program, PhP’000 
      2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1 Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Program   15,863,923 13,308,546 10,064,229 10,178,348 13,565,403 
2 Department  of  Agriculture  14,707,876 11,418,266 9,680,789 9,974,009 12,363,797 
3  Office of the Secretary  13,348,014 9,429,128 8,408,829 8,853,692 10,169,095 
4  Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources  1,112,963 1,715,185 983,409 937,707 1,885,088 
5  Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority  4,424 — — — 979 
6  National Agriculture and Fishery Council  — — 113,703 10,510 128,431 
7  National Meat Inspection Commission  113,526 101,973 95,978 99,929 104,497 
8  Philippine Carabao Center  128,949 171,980 78,870 72,171 75,707 
9   S t a t e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  a n d  c o l l e g e s   —————  
1 0   D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S c i e n c e  a n d  T e c h n o l o g y   1 , 8 0 3————  
11 
Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural      
R e s o u r c e s  R e s e a r c h  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t   1 , 8 0 3————  
12  Budgetary support to government corporations  16,931 443,164 183,440 204,339 230,190 
13  Philippine Rice Research Institute  16,931 370,351 136,000 150,000 150,000 
14 Philippine  Coconut  Authority  — 41,334 35,130 36,200 41,330 
15  Philippine Fisheries Development Authority  — 31,479 12,310 18,139 38,860 
16  Allocation to local government units  1,137,313 1,447,116 200,000 — 971,416 
Source: Expenditure Program, Department of Budget and Management, various issues 36 
 
Table A.2. Utilization of agriculture and fisheries modernization program of the Department of Agriculture, PhP ‘000 
      2001  2002  2003            2004        2005 
1  A. Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Program (AFMP)          
2 Irrigations  5,024,108 5,847,668  4,283,116  3,433,251  3,866,506 
3 Postharvest facilities  670,442 330,217  108,747     474,923  1,015,704 
4 Other infrastructure  833,129 262,037  218,324             —  — 
5 Agro-industry modernization credit and financing program  145,370 4,963  61,387     120,491  90,596 
6 Farmer/fisherfolk marketing assistance  130,052 59,193  58,937       51,109  48,337 
7 Research and development  945,360 553,204  412,017     458,315  495,389 
8 Capability building of farmers and fisherfolk organization and LGUs 
/a/ 890,362 718,478  448,924     378,158    1,090,879 
9 Salary supplement of extension workers under the LGUs  335,300 421,512  519,717     379,134  — 
10 National agricultural and fisheries education system  — —  —              —  — 
11 National information network  56,497 46,605  61,745        43,947  100,845 
12 Rural nonfarm employment training  — —  —              —  — 
13  Subtotal   9,030,620 8,243,877  6,172,914   5,339,328    6,708,256 
14  B. Other Attribution to AFMA 
/b/  
15 Regulatory services  228,247 1,124,419  600,873      478,512  315,346 
16 Production support  1,190,243 1,053,100  2,660,113    2,212,842    2,083,522 
17 Policy and planning  32,585 47,979  114,602       195,468  — 
18 Human resources development  280 6,961  —                —  — 
19 Program management  855,041 481,810  211,403         99,958  473,939 
20  Subtotal   2,306,396 2,714,269  3,586,991     2,986,780     2,872,807 
21  Total (A + B)  11,337,016 10,958,146  9,759,905     8,326,108  9,581,063 
Source: Department of Agriculture 
Notes: /a/ Local government units  
/b/ Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act 
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Table A.3. Expenditure on agriculture and fisheries modernization program, PhP ‘000 
      2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 
1  A. Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Program (AFMP)           
2 Irrigations  5,024,108 5,847,668 4,283,116 3,433,251 3,866,506
3 Postharvest  facilities  670,442 330,217 108,747 474,923 1,015,704
4 Other  infrastructure  833,129 262,037 218,324 — —
5  Agro-industry modernization credit and financing program  145,370 4,963 61,387 120,491 90,596
6 Farmer/fisherfolk  marketing  assistance  130,052 59,193 58,937 51,109 48,337
7 Research  and  development  964,094 923,555 548,017 608,315 645,389
8  Capability building of farmers and fisherfolk organization and LGUs 
/a/ 2,027,675 2,165,594 648,924 378,158 2,062,295
9  Salary supplement of extension workers under the LGUs  335,300 421,512 519,717 379,134 —
10 National agricultural and fisheries education system  — — — — —
11 National information network  56,497 46,605 61,745 43,947 100,845
12 Rural nonfarm employment training  — — — — —
13 Subtotal    10,061,344 6,508,914 5,489,328 7,829,672
14  B. Other Attribution to AFMA 
/b/ 
15 Regulatory services  228,247 1,197,232 648,313 532,851 395,536
16 Production support  1,190,243 1,053,100 2,660,113 2,212,842 2,083,522
17 Policy and planning  32,585 47,979 114,602 195,468 —
18 Human resources development  280 6,961 — — —
19 Program management  855,041 481,810 211,403 99,958 473,939
20 Subtotal    2,306,396 2,787,082 3,634,431 3,041,119 2,952,997
21  Total (A + B)  12,493,063 12,848,426 10,143,345 8,530,447 10,782,669
Source: Department of Agriculture 
Notes: /a/ Local government units  
/b/ Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act 
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The third step was to convert Table A.3 into the WTO notification format for the green box 
payments and SDT. The result of this step is presented in Table A.4. Line 21 in Table A.4 shows the 
stabilization program for food items. Earlier, we identified this item under the budgetary support to the 
NFA, which is not under the AFMA program. Thus, the values for this item were taken directly from the 
GAA. We also identified line 23 (crop insurance) as being under the AFMA program. The values for this 
item were taken directly from the GAA. In reconciling the items in Table A.3 with the WTO notification 
format, we devised and applied the following correspondence matrix to arrive at Table A.4: 
 
Items in WTO Notification Format  Items in Table A.3 
Infrastructure services  Irrigation + postharvest facilities + other infrastructure 
Funds for agricultural investment  Agro-industry modernization credit and financing 
program 
Research  Research and development + policy planning 
Marketing and promotion services  Farmer/fisherfolk marketing assistance + national 
information network 
Extension and advisory services  Salary supplement of extension workers under the LGUs 
+ program management 
Training services  Capability building of farmers and fisherfolk 
organization and LGUs + national agricultural and 
fisheries education system + rural nonfarm employment 
training+ human resources development 
Inspection services  Regulatory services – crop insurance 
Input subsidies to agriculture  Production support 
One may observe no item in this matrix corresponds to investment subsidies to agriculture. We 
suspect that this was lumped in infrastructure services, which, in Table A.3, include irrigation, postharvest 
facilities, and infrastructure. To come up with an entry for this item in Table A.4, we added infrastructure 
services and investment subsidies to agriculture in the actual WTO notification for 1999, 2000, and 2001 
and took the average share of each item over those years. We then applied these average shares to break 
down the total of irrigation, postharvest facilities, and other infrastructure from Table A.3 into 
infrastructure services and investment subsidies to agriculture for Table A.4.  
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Table A.4. Shadow domestic support notification of the Philippines 
      Actual Replication 2002  2003 2004 2005 
1 Green Box Payments (DS: 1), PhP thousand 12,961,350  12,399,44312,692,3637,882,845 6,658,1149,508,551
2 General  services     
3 Research  1,663,077  996,679 971,534 662,619 803,783 645,389
4  Pest and disease control  92,527  — — — — —
5 Training  services  195,976  2,027,955 2,172,555 648,924 378,1582,062,295
6  Extension and advisory services  1,308,252  1,190,341 903,322 731,120 479,092 473,939
7 Inspection  services  108,301  90,657 1,083,461 534,542 419,080 281,765
8  Marketing and promotion services  409,218  186,549 105,798 120,682 95,056 149,182
9 Infrastructure  services  7,804,416  5,244,369 5,173,8653,703,847 3,139,8463,922,392
10  Domestic food aid  —  — — — — —
11  Decoupled income support  —  — — — — —
12  Income insurance and income safety net programs  —  — — — — —
13  Payments for relief from natural disasters  —  — — — — —
14          Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer  — — — — — —
15           Structural adjustment assistance provided through resource  — — — — — —
16  Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment  — — — — — —
17 Environmental  programs  — — — — — —
18 Regional  assistance  programs  — — — — — —
19 Others  — — — — — —
20  Public stocking for food security purposes             
21  Stabilization program for food items  1,241,993  1,241,993 902,000 461,000 461,000 900,000
22  Payments for relief from natural disasters   
23 Crop  insurance  137,590  137,590 113,771 113,771 113,771 113,771
24 Special and Differential Treatment (DS: 2), PhP thousand   3,917,441 1,335,613 1,058,0632,721,500 2,333,3332,174,118
25  Investment subsidies to agriculture 
/a/ 2,322,922  1,283,310 1,266,057 906,340 768,328 959,818
26 Input  subsidies 
/b/ 1,570,854  1,190,243 1,053,1002,660,113 2,212,8422,083,522
27  Funds for agricultural investment 
/c/ 23,665  145,370 4,963 61,387 120,491 90,596
Notes: /a/ Soft loans and grants for agricultural investment—These involve the provision of loans and grants for irrigation and other farm infrastructure support, farm equipment, 
postharvest facilities, research development, training, and extension activities. 
/b/ Provision of access to farm inputs—This measure provides low-income resource-poor producers with the opportunity to have easier access to good-quality inputs, such as 
seeds, planting materials, fertilizers, and animal stock in order to improve farm productivity. 
/c/ Investment credit and grants—Government funds directed to improve rural structure, acquisition of machines, equipment, and postharvest facilities. 
 40 
 
Our replication of the 2001 notification is not perfect. We did not have indicators for expenditure 
on pest and disease controls. The expenditure for training services is larger than what was reported in the 
official notification. Our estimates of expenditure on infrastructure services and investment subsidies to 
agriculture are lower than the numbers reported in the notification. Overall, our estimate of the sum of the 
green box payments and SDT is lower than the notification by P562 million. We applied this replication 
method, which provides our best estimates given the available information, to arrive at the shadow 
notification for the green box and SDT from 2002 to 2005. 
We further extended the series until 2008, using information from the GAA for 2006, 2007, and 
2008. We applied the numbers for the stabilization program for food items and crop insurance directly 
from the GAA for these years. We took the average ratio between line 21 in Table A.3 and the 
expenditure for the AFMA program in 2001–2005 (note that Table A.3 captures the utilization of funds 
for the AFMA program). We applied this average ratio to the budget for the AFMA program for 2006, 
2007, and 2008 to extend line 21 in Table A.3 for those years.  
We computed the percentage distribution of the components of Table A.3 for 2001–2005. For 
each item, we took the average over these years. We then distributed line 21 in Table A.3 for 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 to each item, using this average percentage distribution. The complete extended series is 
presented in Table A.5.  
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Table A.5. Shadow domestic support notification of the Philippines, 2006–2008 
      2006 2007  2008 
1 Green Box Payments (DS: 1), PhP thousands 7,314,776 10,379,016 16,345,962
2 General  Services 
3 Research  668,296 966,695 1,494,573
4  Pest and disease control  — — —
5 Training  services  1,125,094 1,627,456 2,516,154
6  Extension and advisory services  602,291 871,218 1,346,960
7 Inspection  services  375,708 594,264 980,898
8  Marketing and promotion services  107,061 154,864 239,430
9 Infrastructure  services  3,422,554 4,950,746 7,654,176
10  Domestic food aid  — — —
11  Decoupled income support  — — —
12  Income insurance and income safety net programs  — — —
13  Payments for relief from natural disasters  — — —
14  Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement programs  — — —
15  Structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programs  — — —
16 Structural  adjustment assistance provided through investment aids  — — —
17 Environmental  programs  — — —
18 Regional  assistance  programs  — — —
19 Others  ———
20  Public stocking for food security purposes       
21  Stabilization program for food items  900,000 1,100,000 2,000,000
22  Payments for relief from natural disasters       
23 Crop  insurance  113,771 113,771 113,771
24 Special and Differential Treatment (DS: 2), PhP thousand  2,500,627 3,617,173 5,592,385
25  Investment subsidies to agriculture 
/a/ 837,507 1,211,459 1,872,995
26 Input  subsidies 
/b/ 1,590,725 2,300,994 3,557,486
27  Funds for agricultural investment 
/c/ 72,395 104,720 161,904
Notes: /a/ Soft loans and grants for agricultural investment—These involve the provision of loans and grants for irrigation and other farm infrastructure support,  
farm equipment, postharvest facilities, research development, training, and extension activities. 
/b/ Provision of access to farm inputs—This measure provides low-income resource-poor producers with the opportunity to have easier access to good-quality  
inputs, such as seeds, planting materials, fertilizers, and animal stock, in order to improve farm productivity. 
/c/ Investment credit and grants—Government funds directed to improve rural structure, acquisition of machines, equipment, and postharvest facilities. 
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APPENDIX B: ESTIMATING MPS 
We now look closely at the calculation of the MPS. Table B.1 shows the details of the calculation of the 
MPS for rice. The external reference price is P4.56 per kilogram, which is the average for the period 
1986–1988. The administered price is about P14 per kilogram. The NFA procurement is palay production 
in Table B.2 multiplied by a 65 percent recovery ratio plus the small amount of rice procurement by NFA 
in 1995 and 1996. The MPS is the difference between the administered and the external reference price 
multiplied by NFA procurement. The results indicate that the MPS for rice is substantially lower than the 
10 percent value of rice production. 
Table B.1. WTO notification, market price support for rice, 1995-2001 
   Price (PhP/kg)  NFA  Market Price      
  External    Procurement Support  Value of Production (PhP mil.) 
   Reference Administered  (’000 MT)  (PhP mil.)  Total  10% of Total 
1995 4.56  14.00  27 257 103,121 10,312 
1996 4.56  14.00  93 877 116,025 11,603 
1997 4.56  14.00  65 617 111,484 11,148 
1998 4.56  13.20  40 347 87,747 8,775 
1999 4.56  14.67  364 3,683 120,665 12,067 
2000 4.56  14.62  431 4,337 128,125 12,812 
2001 4.56  14.62  310 3,122 134,647 13,465 
Source: WTO Notification and Philippine National Income Accounts 
Table B.2. Production and NFA intervention in rice and corn (’000 metric tons) 
   Palay and Rice             
   NFA  Intervention  Corn 
 Palay  Procurement        NFA  Intervention 




Importation ProductionProcurement  ImportationInjection
1974 3,560  94  —  194  —  3,219  1  — 5 
1975 3,994  233  —  227  —  3,374  673  —  26 
1976 4,163  274  —  255  —  3,209  43  —  34 
1977 4,295  650  —  202  —  2,864  84  —  29 
1978 4,187  519  —  123  —  3,062  154  —  28 
1979 4,357  758  —  61  —  3,080  56  —  68 
1980 4,408  551  —  280  —  3,050  13 219  101 
1981 4,445  581  —  304  —  3,296  62 256  277 
1982 4,658  649  —  244  —  3,404  68 342  306 
1983 4,643  534  —  799  —  3,134  120 521  465 
1984 4,744  298  —  505  191  3,250  15 183  199 
1985 5,059  401  —  365  249  3,863  110 247  144 
1986 5,266  422  —  113  6  4,091  34  6  105 
1987 5,177  572  —  467  —  4,278  27  50  110 
1988 5,496  264  —  405  181  4,428  122  25  65 
1989 5,974  208  —  472  209  4,522  0 172  98 
1990 9,673  572  —  670  621  4,854  320 354  50 
1991 9,129  555  —  158  —  4,655  99  —  186 
1992 9,434  420  —  521  —  4,619  6  —  166 43 
 
Table B.2. Continued 
   Palay and Rice             
   NFA  Intervention  Corn 
 Palay  Procurement        NFA  Intervention 




Importation Production Procurement  ImportationInjection
            
1993 10,538  155  —  485 210 4,798 9  —  7 
1994 10,541  61  —  112 — 4,519 7  — 11 
1995 11,284 8  22  257 257 4,129 —  207  1 
1996 11,269  124  0.6  733 893 4,151 12  558  1 
1997 11,269  101  —  623 720 4,332 40  172 39 
1998 8,555  62  —  1,627 2,136 3,823 208 317  108 
1999 11,787  561  —  1,372 782 4,585 —  —  159 
2000 12,389  663  —  1,169 617 4,511 8  60 43 
2001 12,955  474  —  813 739 4,525 —  33 33 
2002 13,271  300  —  1,239 1,238 4,319 —  157 — 
2003 13,500  296  —  1,120 698 4,616 —  — — 
2004 14,497  208  —  1,342 984 5,413 —  — — 
2005 14,603  76  —  1,666 1,805 5,253 3  67  2 
2006 15,327  73  —  1,508 1,622 6,082 —  —  0.1 
Source: National Food Authority  
Table B.3 shows the comparison of the price of rice. In principle, for the administered support 
price to be effective in helping farmers, it has to be above the farm gate price. However, in 1995, 1996, 
and 1998, this support price was lower. The wholesale price of rice is higher than the administered ceiling 
price, which should be the case in order to protect consumers from price surges. The difference between 
the wholesale and the border price is the nominal protection rate. One can observe from the price 
comparison that the administered price used in the WTO notification is similar or close to the rice ceiling 
price. This implies that the computed MPS for rice in the notification measures price gap closer to the 
level of consumers than producers. The correct price to use should be the support price for farmers.  
However, the support price available is for palay and not for rice. Using the 65 percent recovery 
ratio, we converted the palay support price in terms of the price of rice as the palay support price divided 
by 0.65. The results indicate that from 1995 to 1998, the support price in terms of the price of rice was 
lower than the WTO notification administered price; however, from 1999 to 2001, it was higher. From 
2001 onward, we used the palay support price converted to the price of rice. We did not use the 
administered rice ceiling price in the WTO notification. 44 
 
Table B.3. Price comparison (PhP/kg) 
      Administered        WTO   (Farm Gate  (Palay 
  Farm Gate  Palay  Rice  Rice  Rice  Notification  Palay   Support 





   Price  Price  Price  Price  Price  Price 
/a/ /a/ 
1995 7.24  6.00  10.25  14.06 8.58 14.00 11.14  9.23 
1996 8.13  7.83  13.69  15.84 8.32 14.00 12.51  12.05 
1997 7.92  8.00  14.00  15.22 8.36 14.00 12.18  12.31 
1998 8.30  8.00  14.00  15.78 11.74 13.20 12.77  12.31 
1999 7.87  9.83  14.00  15.75 9.46 14.67 12.11  15.13 
2000 8.53  10.00  14.00  15.91 8.49 14.62 13.12  15.38 
2001 8.45  10.00  14.00  15.99 8.74 14.62 13.00  15.38 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, WTO Notification. 
Note: /a/ 0.65 is the palay recovery ratio. 
Table B.4 shows the quantity comparison. As indicated in the WTO notification, rice 
procurement of the NFA increased from 27,000 metric tons in 1995 to 310,000 metric tons in 2000. We 
tried replicating this series using official data on rice and palay in Table B.2. The results are shown under 
the column “Palay + Rice Procurement.” which shows values similar to the values in the notification with 
very small difference, except in 1996 and 2001. 
Table B.4. Quantity comparison (’000 metric tons) 
            NFA 
 WTO         Rice 
 Notification     Palay    Palay    Palay  +     
 NFA  Palay  Converted  Palay  Converted Rice Rice     
   Procurement  Production  into Rice 
/a/ Procurement into Rice  Procurement Procurement Imports Total 
1995 27  11,284  7,334  8  5  22  27  257  285 
1996 93  11,269  7,325  124  81  1  81  893  974 
1997 65  11,269  7,325  101  65  —  65  720  786 
1998 40  8,555  5,561  62  40  —  40  2,136  2,176 
1999 364  11,787  7,661  561  364  —  364  782  1,146 
2000 431  12,389  8,053  663  431  —  431  617  1,048 
2001 310  12,955  8,421  474  308  —  308  739  1,048 
Note: /a/ using 0.65 recovery ratio 
The MPS for corn is simpler than it is for rice. The NFA corn procurement is the same as the 
numbers reported in the WTO notification. Because NFA corn procurement is almost zero, the MPS is 
also very small relative to the 10 percent de minimis limit. 45 
 
Table B.5. Market price support for corn, 1995-2001 
   External  Administered                   
  Reference  Corn  Wholesale    NFA Corn  MPS (PhP mil) 
  Price of  Support  Price of Corn Production  Procurement WTO   Value of Production 
   Corn (PhP/kg)  Price (PhP/kg)  (PhP/kg)  Corn (’000 MT) (’000 MT)  Notification  Total  10% of Total
1995 2.26  4.50  7.40 4,129 — —  30,551 3,055
1996 2.26  5.25  7.71 4,151 12 35  32,007 3,201
1997 2.26  6.00  7.63 4,332 40 148  33,057 3,306
1998 2.26  6.00  8.32 3,823 208 779  31,809 3,181
1999 2.26  6.00  8.47 4,585 — —  38,831 3,883
2000 2.26  6.00  9.20 4,511 8 30  41,502 4,150
2001 2.26  6.00  9.43 4,525 — —  42,671 4,267
Table B.6 presents the data used in our estimates for calculating the MPS for rice for 2001 to 
2008. Data from 2001 to 2007 are actual values from official sources. The support price of P14.67/kg is 
based on the press release from the DA, which stated that the government would increase the support 
price of palay to P17/kg starting May 2008 until the end of the year. Therefore, the price support is 
P10/kg from January to April and P17/kg from May to December. The average price for 2008 is 
P14.68/kg. Converted into rice price, the result is P22.56/kg, which is 46.7 percent higher relative to 
2007. The wholesale price of rice in 2007 was P20.66 percent. We assume a 40 percent increase in the 
wholesale price of rice in 2008.  
NFA rice procurement was low in 2005 (76 tons) and 2006 (73 tons). We assume a slightly 
higher procurement of 100 tons in 2007 and 200 tons in 2008. The MPS in 2007 was P704 million, 
increasing to P2.3 billion in 2008. From 2001 to 2008, the MPS was significantly lower than the 10 
percent de minis limit. 
Table B.7 shows the information used in our estimates for calculating the MPS for corn. Data 
from 2001 to 2007 are actual values from official sources. The support price for corn was increased to 
P10/kg in May 2008. The average for 2008 was P9.50/kg. We assume that the wholesale price of corn 
will follow the rate of increase in the administered price for 2008. We calculated the average growth in 
corn production in 2006 and 2007 and applied this to estimate the production of corn in 2008. Because 
there was practically no NFA procurement in 2001 to 2007 (except for the 3,000 tons in 2005), we 
assume zero NFA procurement of corn in 2008. Thus, the MPS for corn is also zero. 
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Table B.6. Market price support for rice, 2001-2008 
   External  Administered Price (PhP/kg)                        
  Reference  Palay  (Palay  Wholesale      NFA (’000 MT)  MPS (PhP mil) Value of Production 
  Price of  Support  Support  Price of Rice Production (’000 MT) Palay    WTO   (PhP mil) 
   Rice (PhP/kg)  Price  Price) / 0.65  (PhP/kg)  Palay  Rice 
/a/ Procurement  Rice 
/a/ Notification   Total  10% of Total
2001 4.56  10.00  15.38  15.99  12,955  8,421  474  308  3,337  134,647  13,465 
2002 4.56  10.00  15.38  16.52  13,271  8,626  300  195  2,109  142,501  14,250 
2003 4.56  10.00  15.38  16.51  13,500  8,775  296  192  2,083  144,874  14,487 
2004 4.56  10.00  15.38  17.30  14,497  9,423  208  135  1,461  163,017  16,302 
2005 4.56  10.00  15.38  19.14  14,603  9,492  76  50  538  181,676  18,168 
2006 4.56  10.00  15.38  19.49  15,327  9,962  73  48  514  194,166  19,417 
2007 4.56  10.00  15.38  20.66  16,240  10,556 100  65  704  218,090  21,809 
2008 4.56  14.67  22.56  28.92  17,127  11,132 200  130  2,341  321,990  32,199 
Note: /a/ using 0.65 conversion ratio 
Table B.7. Market price support for corn, 2001-2008 
   External  Administered                   
  Reference  Corn  Wholesale    NFA Corn    Value of Production 
  Price of  Support  Price of Corn Production  Procurement MPS (PhP mil)  (PhP mil) 
   Corn (PhP/kg)  Price (PhP/kg)  (PhP/kg)  Corn (’000 MT) (’000 MT)  WTO Notification Total  10% of Total
2001 2.26  6.00  9.43  4,525  —  —  42,671  4,267 
2002 2.26  6.00  8.91  4,319  —  —  38,485  3,848 
2003 2.26  6.00  8.56  4,616  —  —  39,510  3,951 
2004 2.26  6.08  10.14  5,413  —  —  54,892  5,489 
2005 2.26  7.13  9.48  5,253  3  16  49,800  4,980 
2006 2.26  8.50  10.85  6,082  —  —  65,991  6,599 
2007 2.26  8.50  11.44  6,737  —  —  77,071  7,707 
2008 2.26  9.50  12.79  7,631  —  —  97,571  9,757 47 
 
REFERENCES 
Aldaba, R. 2005. “Policy reversals, lobby groups, and economic distortions”. Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies (PIDS) Discussion Paper 2005-04. Makati City, Philippines: PIDS. 
Austria M., and E. Medalla. 1996. “A study on the trade and investment policies of developing countries: The case 
of the Philippines”. Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) Discussion Paper 96-03. Makati 
City, Philippines: PIDS. 
Coxhead I. and S. Jayasuriya. 2003. “Environment and natural resources” in The Philippine economy: Development, 
policies and challenges, A. Balisacan and H. Hill, eds., pp. 381-417. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 
Philippines. 
David, C., P. Intal, and A. Balisacan. 2007. “Distortions to agricultural incentives in the Philippines.” Agricultural 
Distortions Research Project. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
David, C. 2006. The Philippine Hybrid Rice Program: A case for redesign and scaling down. Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies (PIDS) Research Paper 2006-03. Makati City, Philippines: PIDS. 
David, C. 2003. Agriculture. In The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies and Challenges, eds. A. Balisacan 
and H. Hill, 175–218. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila Press. 
Dawe, D. C., P. F. Moya, and C. B. Casiwan. 2005. “Why Does the Philippines Import Rice?” Los Baños, Laguna, 
Philippines:International Rice Research Institute.  
Department of Agriculture (DA). Various Issues. Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), Manila, Philippines:BAS. 
Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Various Issues. General Appropriations Act. Manila, Philippines: 
DBM. 
Department of Finance (DOF). Various Issues. Manila, Philippines: DOF. 
Habito, C. and R. Briones (2005) “Philippine agriculture over the years: Performance, policies and pitfalls”, Paper 
presented at the conference on Policies to strengthen productivity in the Philippines. June 27, 2005. Makati 
City, Philippines. 
Intal, P., and J. Power. 1990. “Trade, exchange rate, and agricultural pricing policy in the Philippines: Comparative 
studies on political economy of agricultural pricing policy”. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2008.  Commodity Prices. Washington D.C.:IMF. 
Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific (PAN AP). 2007. “Hybrid Rice in Asia: Sowing the Seeds of 
Dependency”. Penang, Malaysia: PAN AP. Available at: 
http://www.panap.net/48.0.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=435&tx_ttnews[backPid]=11&cHash=bb5b8a0
f54 
Mundlak, Y. D. Larson, and R. Butzer (2004) “Agricultural dynamics in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines”. 
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 48(1):95–126. 
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). Various Issues. National Income Accounts.  Manila, Philippines: 
NSCB. 
World Bank. 2007. “Philippines: Agriculture Public Expenditure Review.” Technical Working Paper 40493. Manila, 
Philippines: The World Bank Country Office. 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Various Issues. Time Series on Merchandise and Commercial Services Trade. 
Geneva: WTO. 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 2002. Notification (G/GA/N/PHL/23). Committee on Agriculture. Geneva: 
World Trade Organization. 
  
 
RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
826.  What determines adult cognitive skills?: Impacts of preschooling, schooling, and post-schooling experiences in 
Guatemala. Jere R. Behrman, John Hoddinott, John A. Maluccio, Erica Soler-Hampejsek, Emily L. Behrman, Reynaldo 
Martorell, Manuel Ramírez-Zea, and Aryeh D. Stein, 2008. 
825.  Accelerating Africa’s food production in response to rising food prices: Impacts and requisite actions. Xinshen Diao, 
Shenggen Fan, Derek Headey, Michael Johnson, Alejandro Nin Pratt, Bingxin Yu, 2008. 
824.  The effects of alternative free trade agreements on Peru: Evidence from a global computable general equilibrium model. 
Antoine Bouët, Simon Mevel, and Marcelle Thomas, 2008. 
823.  It’s a small world after all. Defining smallholder agriculture in Ghana. Jordan Chamberlin, 2008 
822.  Japan: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications. Yoshihisa Godo and Daisuke Takahashi, 2008. 
821.  United States: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications. David Blandford and David Orden, 2008. 
820.  Information flow and acquisition of knowledge in water governance in the Upper East Region of Ghana. Eva Schiffer, 
Nancy McCarthy, Regina Birner, Douglas Waale, and Felix Asante, 2008. 
819.  Supply of pigeonpea genetic resources in local markets of Eastern Kenya. , Patrick Audi, and Richard Jones, 2008. 
818.  Persistent poverty and welfare programs in the United States.  John M. Ulimwengu, 2008. 
817.  Social learning, selection, and HIV infection: Evidence from Malawi. Futoshi Yamauchi and Mika Ueyama, 2008. 
816.  Evaluating the impact of social networks in rural innovation systems: An overview. Ira Matuschke, 2008. 
815.  Migration and technical efficiency in cereal production: Evidence from Burkina Faso. Fleur S. Wouterse, 2008. 
814.  Improving farm-to-market linkages through contract farming: A case study of smallholder dairying in India. Pratap S. 
Birthal, Awadhesh K. Jha, Marites M. Tiongco, and Clare Narrod, 2008. 
813.  Policy options and their potential effects on Moroccan small farmers and the poor facing increased world food prices: A 
general equilibrium model analysis. 2008. Xinshen Diao, Rachid Doukkali, Bingxin Yu, 2008. 
812.  Norway: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications. Ivar Gaasland, Robert Garcia, and Erling Vårdal, 
2008. 
811.  Reaching middle-income status in Ghana by 2015: Public expenditures and agricultural growth. Samuel Benin, Tewodaj 
Mogues, Godsway Cudjoe, and Josee Randriamamonjy, 2008. 
810.   Integrating survey and ethnographic methods to evaluate conditional cash transfer programs. Michelle Adato, 2008. 
809.  European Union: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications. Tim Josling and Alan Swinbank, 2008. 
808.  Bt Cotton and farmer suicides in India: Reviewing the evidence. Guillaume P. Gruère, Purvi Mehta-Bhatt, and Debdatta 
Sengupta, 2008. 
807.  Gender, caste, and public goods provision in Indian village governments. Kiran Gajwani and Xiaobo Zhang, 2008. 
806.  Measuring Ethiopian farmers’ vulnerability to climate change across regional states. Temesgen Deressa, Rashid M. 
Hassan, and Claudia
 Ringler, 2008. 
805.  Determinants of agricultural protection from an international perspective: The role of political institutions. Christian 
H.C.A. Henning, 2008 
804.  Vulnerability and the impact of climate change in South Africa’s Limpopo River Basin. Sharon Shewmake, 2008. 
803.  Biofuels, poverty, and growth: A computable general equilibrium analysis of Mozambique. Channing Arndt, Rui Benfica, 
Finn Tarp, James Thurlow, and Rafael Uaiene, 2008. 
802.  Agricultural exit problems: Causes and consequences. Derek Headey, Dirk Bezemer, and Peter B. Hazell, 2008. 
801.  Cotton-textile-apparel sectors of India: Situations and challenges faced. Jatinder S. Bedi and Caesar B. Cororaton, 2008.   




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P. O. Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: +251 11 6463215 
Fax: +251 11 6462927 
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org 
IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572 
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org 